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„I will tell you how to become rich. Close the doors. Be fearful when 
others are greedy. Be greedy when others are fearful.” 
 
                                                                                    (Warren Buffett) 
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1 Introduction 
 
Why value investing? 
 
Today, there is a broad variety of different investment strategies to choose from. Why 
did I choose to write about value investing? 
 
First of all, according to the existing evidence the value investing strategy seems to 
produce superior results comparing to any other investment strategy over long-term 
period. At the same time, it is simple and easy to understand. Second, Warren Buffett, 
one of the richest men in the world, has made a fortune thanks to the value strategy 
investments. A number of other value practitioners had also succeeded in achieving 
returns higher than the market. There is a lot of controversy when it comes to the 
explanation of their success in beating the market. On the one hand, the higher returns are 
considered to reflect the market risk premium according to the Efficient Market Hypothesis. 
On the other hand, according to the behavioral finance theory, its sources could rather be 
found in the market inefficiencies. All of this makes value investing such an intriguing 
subject: Its results are in contradiction with the “educated” believes. Common for all 
successful value investors is that their philosophy is based on principles originally derived 
by so-called father of value investing – Benjamin Graham. 
 
How does value investing work? 
 
The section 2 of my thesis provides an answer to this question. Value investing deals 
with investing in stocks whose current price is below their true or intrinsic value, 
assuming that over the time market will correct for any mispricing and value investors 
will get rewarded for the risk taken. Value investing encourages buying cheap stocks 
that are out of favor (depending, of course, for what reasons they became “unpopular”). 
Contrary to what majority of investors do, value investors buy stocks in bad times and 
sell in good times. Is such a philosophy profitable? Well, many researchers have found 
that buying stocks that have fallen in price and still offer margin of safety results in 
successful investment over time. It is widely accepted that value investment works best 
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when markets are declining. The margin of safety is exactly what protects investors from 
large losses during recessions. Numerous empirical studies have provided a proof for 
that. 
 
There are different strategies behind value investing. Some of them are more passive 
and concentrate mostly on the quantitative factors to identify value stocks. Others are 
more active strategies and extend the analysis on the qualitative factors as well. 
Unfortunately, there is no any rule which says which strategy is the best to find the real 
value of a stock. Many investors rely on the financial ratios when it comes to the 
quantitative analysis of the companies such as: price-to-book, price-to-earnings, price-
to-sales ratio, dividend yield and so on. These are some of the most frequently used 
“value screens”. In the section 3 of my thesis I provide an insight into the most 
interesting empirical findings based on these four investing tools. I do not restrict myself 
only to the US stock market (most of the existing evidence relates to this market), but 
also mention the international markets.  
 
What are the reasons that value investing outperforms the market over the long run? 
 
There are different replies to this question, which I review in the fourth section of my 
thesis. The first part of this section introduces the traditional risk-based explanation by 
exploring several academic papers supporting this point of view. The risk-based theory 
argues that higher value returns are simply a premium for additional risk taken since 
value stocks are fundamentally riskier than growth stocks. Academic researchers, Fama 
and French, challenged the traditional Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) by analyzing 
this issue. They largely shaped the investment world by providing strong evidence on 
several contradictions of the Sharpe-Lintner-Black model and introducing the Three 
Factor Model. On the other hand, there is a research field called behavioral finance 
which uses the psychological researches to analyze investors’ behavior. According to 
this theory, the explanation of the value premium can be found in a frequent irrational 
behavior of the individual investors and their tendency to make judgment errors. They 
usually put an excessive weight on past stock performance which is unlikely to persist in 
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the future. In the second part of the fourth section, I deal with different behavioral biases 
considered to be a source of the stocks’ mispricing.  
 
How does value investing strategy perform in Europe? 
 
I have tried to find an answer to this question by conducting my own empirical study of 
the European stock market represented by the market index Dow Jones Stoxx 600. The 
analysis is based on the four value screens introduced in the theoretical part of my 
thesis: price-to-book, price-to-earnings, price-to-sales ratio and dividend yield. The main 
goal was to find out whether value stocks outperformed growth stocks and the market 
over the seven-year period observed. The results are provided in the section 5.   
 
Even though success of many investors in applying the value method has proven that it 
works, one of the strange things is that there are still no many who dare to get involved 
in this strategy. Possible explanation could be that one can never know how long it could 
last until the market recognizes the true value of a stock. Some investors do not have 
the patience or the interest to wait for too long, and some do not have the nerves for 
watching their stocks falling substantially in value (since value investing is associated 
with high uncertainty and volatility in stock prices). Furthermore, career and reputation 
concerns force the professional money managers to stick to their short-term strategies. 
This kind of a behavior, typical for the majority of investors, is of advantage for value 
investors since they are actually profiting by exploiting mistakes of “typical” investors. In 
his foreword to Christopher Brown’s “The Little Book of Value Investing”, Roger 
Lowenstein says: “…it is the hesitation of the many that creates the opportunity for the 
few.”1 The fact is, as more and more investors begin to exercise value-investing style the 
more difficult will be to find bargains and earn returns as high as it was possible in the 
past. 
    
 
 
 
                                            
1
 cf Browne, C., “The Little Book of Value Investing”, 2006, Foreword [xvii]. 
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2 Value Investing Strategies 
2.1 Definition and Basic Principles 
 
Investment strategies are generally divided into two broad style groups: value and 
growth investing.  
 
Value investing deals with selecting the stocks that trade at a discount compared to their 
intrinsic value, assuming that the market will correct for undervaluation in the long run. 
The core elements of value investing are: intrinsic value, margin of safety and long-term 
perspective. 
 
Value investors are, first of all, concerned with the intrinsic or actual value of the 
company, i.e. with its underlying fundamentals. They believe that share prices do not 
always indicate the true underlying value of the company’s shares. Therefore, after 
determining the true value, the second thing they look at is whether it is possible to 
purchase shares for less than their intrinsic value is. They see a huge investment 
opportunity in a difference between market and intrinsic value. This concept, derived by 
Benjamin Graham, is best known as “margin of safety”. It gives investors protection 
against uncertainty in calculating the true worth of the stock. The intrinsic value and 
margin of safety concept make value investors to be contrarian to a typical way of 
thinking in a way that they are buying stocks when everyone else is selling, and selling 
when everyone else is buying. The stock price higher than its intrinsic value is a signal 
that the stock should be sold. 
 
Benjamin Graham encourages investors to be the investors buying businesses for the 
long term, and not speculators seeking for the short-term profits. Distinction between 
speculation and investment is one of the central points of his investment philosophy: “An 
investment operation is one which, upon thorough analysis promises safety of principal 
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and adequate return. Operations not meeting these requirements are speculative.”2 
Value investors search for the undervalued companies within the safe and solid 
businesses, the companies that have a long-term history of success. They do not see 
the shares of stock purchased only as a piece of paper that will bring some profits in the 
future, but rather as an ownership interest in the underlying business. One of the world’s 
best investors, Warren Buffett, once said: “I’m a better investor because I am a 
businessman and a better businessman because I am an investor.”3 Value investors do 
not really care about a general mood on the market and economic circumstances. They 
believe that a good business will survive any market volatilities in the long run. 
 
In “The Intelligent Investor” (1949) Graham states that investment is most intelligent 
when it is most businesslike, i.e. it must be approached as if one was buying a business 
or a partnership in a business. Warren Buffett regarded these words as the most 
important words about investment ever written. They incorporate some basic principles 
by which Graham was guided: 
 
1. Know the business 
 
The business needs to be understandable for investors. They should gather 
information on company’s operations, competitive environment, long-term 
prospects etc. It is recommended to invest rather in fewer businesses but well 
known than on a larger number of businesses that an investor is not very familiar 
with. 
 
2. Know who runs the business 
 
The investor should make sure that the company has competent and efficient 
managers who work in the best interest of the shareholders. 
                                            
2
 cf Azlan, “Review of The Intelligent Investor”, 2006.  
http://bookreviews.wallstraits.net/bookreviews/value-investing/10/the-intelligent-investor.html; 
Original source: Benjamin Graham, ”The Intelligent Investor”, 1949.  
3
 cf Stone, A., “Homespun Wisdom from the ‘Oracle of Omaha’”, 1999. 
www.businessweek.com/1999/99_27/b3636006 
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3. Invest for profits 
 
The business that investors want to invest in should have reasonable 
expectations of producing good profits over time. 
 
4. Have confidence 
 
Graham encourages investors to invest if they believe their judgment to be 
correct. He said that the stock investor can be right or wrong because his facts 
and analysis are right or wrong, and not because others agree or disagree with 
him. 
 
Thanks to their high quality, the companies typically chosen by value investors often 
survive market volatilities and are likely to generate great returns over the long-term 
horizon. Because value investors do not try to act along with the market, they are 
prepared to high declines in value of their securities before reaching some gains. They 
do not try to forecast the market but focus instead on the underlying values and identify 
companies that are able to recover after any market recession. And of course, they 
expect that the market will revalue the stocks over time, and that the share price will 
reach its intrinsic value. 
 
Value investors usually do not give much importance to what the market thinks because 
companies can be undervalued or overvalued regardless what the overall market is 
doing. “Being a value investor usually means standing apart from the crowd, challenging 
conventional wisdom, and opposing the prevailing investment winds.”4 
  
 
 
 
 
                                            
4
 cf Klarman, S. A., “Margin of Safety”, 1992, p. 88. 
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2.2 Margin of Safety 
 
The margin of safety concept, as laid down by Benjamin Graham, still makes an 
essence for value investors. It represents a mathematical part of Graham’s work and is 
defined as a difference between share price and its intrinsic value.  
 
The price should be one at which a share can be bought with a minimal downside risk. It 
should be well below a fundamental value of the business, which would allow profit to go 
on the upside as the market revalues the stock to its fair value. The stock bought with a 
margin of safety should therefore be a “low risk - high return” investment. 
 
It is important to keep in mind that the margin of safety price is not the same as the 
intrinsic value of a share. The intrinsic value is calculated differently by different 
investors, and there is always probability that it is calculated wrongly or affected by 
some external factors. That is why investors should have margin of safety as a 
protection against incorrect intrinsic value which in many cases cannot be predicted or 
avoided. The larger is the margin, the safer the investment. The benchmark that 
Benjamin Graham used for margin of safety was the interest rate for the prime quality 
bonds. Today, as it is more practical, Warren Buffett uses an interest rate for the 
government bonds.  
 
To find the stocks with a margin of safety, the popular stocks in general should be 
avoided because they are likely to be overpriced. Growth stocks for example are 
considered to be popular stocks. They tend to be overpriced in good markets and 
perform poorly in bad markets. A concept of finding low price-to-earnings (P/E) ratios, 
price-to-book (P/B) value ratios etc. should be applied. Graham looked at the companies 
with P/E ratios below their historical average and less than 40 % of the average market 
P/E ratio. He was an advocate of paying dividends and believed that conservative 
investors should search for the companies that have a long dividend-paying history. He 
also looked at the companies with high liquidity, i.e. those that had current assets twice 
higher than current liabilities. Upward earnings trend of the companies was also 
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important: He searched for those with growth of earnings per share 7 % or more for the 
last decade and no more than two years of decreasing earnings over the last decade.   
 
Today, it is difficult to apply Graham’s method and ratios as the world has changed and 
there are more and more overvalued and profitless companies. Before he died in 1976, 
Graham admitted that his rules had to be relaxed. Buffett insists though, that even at 
today’s price levels, Graham would have found some bargains. 
 
2.3 Value versus Growth 
 
While the emphasis of value investing is on buying stocks below their intrinsic value, 
growth investing deals with buying the stocks of the companies with high growth rates 
without much emphasis on its present prices. As opposed to the value investing strategy 
that bets on low expectations, the growth investing strategy bets on high expectations 
for the stocks. What both strategies have in common is belief that these expectations 
will increase in the future.  
 
It is widely accepted opinion that value and growth investing are two contrasting 
strategies. However, Warren Buffett states that growth is a component in a value 
equation, and that investors who see the two strategies as contrasting are simply 
ignoring this fact. In his Berkshire Hathaway Annual Report in 1992 he said: “In our 
opinion, the two approaches are joined at the hip: Growth is always a component in the 
calculation of value, constituting a variable whose importance can range from negligible 
to enormous and whose impact can be negative as well as positive.”5 The growth 
investors can therefore benefit only if growth has a positive impact, i.e. if it increases the 
market value of the firm. 
 
The growth investing strategy assumes that the market has undervalued companies’ 
future growth potential. In order to be successful, growth investors must forecast the 
                                            
5
 cf Professor Paul Johnson, “Value versus Growth Investing”, Columbia University, Graduate School of 
Business, 2004, p. 2; 
Original source: Warren Buffett, Berkshire Hathaway Annual Report, 1992. 
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company’s future growth rates and profitability as well as its potential to exceed their 
expectations. The criterions that the growth investors use are based on past 
performance of the company as well as its industry performance. They assume that if 
the company was growing in the last couple of years, it will continue to do so in the 
future as well. They also assume that the growth companies still have not reached their 
maximum earnings because they are currently at the beginning of the growth stage. 
That is why these companies are characterized by a high price-to-earnings ratio. Value 
investors are more sensitive to a risk and they are not willing to make estimation of the 
future growth rates as growth investors. 
  
Growth investors generally seek for the high earnings growth rate, high sales growth 
rate, high return on equity, high profit margins, and low or no dividend yield. The 
companies meeting those criteria are usually young companies, e.g. small cap 
technology companies. They have a potential to grow quickly as opposed to large cap 
companies. What is very important for growth investors is that companies keep 
reinvesting into themselves. This makes them able to grow at a higher rate by, for 
example, producing new products and technologies. 
 
Growth investors are considered to be trend-setting. They are pooling almost the whole 
market to follow their example. This can often lead to overpricing of the security. This 
was the case in 2000 when technology-driven companies failed to meet expectations set 
by the market. The majority of the investors are likely to invest when the stock prices are 
rising and the market is doing well. In his letter to the shareholders in 1997 Warren 
Buffett gives a comment on this behavior: “Only those who will be sellers of equities in 
the near future should be happy at seeing stocks rise. Prospective purchasers should 
much prefer sinking prices.”6 As more and more investors follow the trend and do what 
everyone else is doing, they turn out to be at disadvantage because chances of making 
money from popular stocks decrease. In the letter from the year 2005 Buffett said: “For 
investors as a whole, returns decrease as motion increases.”7 
                                            
6
 cf Sinha, C., “4 investing gems from Warren Buffett”, 2007. 
http://www.rediff.com///money/2007/jul/12invest.htm 
7
 Ibid. 
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It is a common characteristic of all people to follow the crowd. Otherwise, investors 
would feel like missing a good opportunity by not participating in a stock’s appreciation. 
This has a lot to do with psychology: They feel better if everyone loses what they have 
lost. People also have a certain reaction to bad news: They get scared that a negative 
trend could last for a long time. After all, it is not in everyone’s interest to wait a couple of 
months or years until the stock gets fairly priced by the market. The fear of not being 
successful exists not only among individual investors, but also among professional asset 
managers. The reason for this is obvious: “The reputational and career risk of being a 
contrarian is far greater than the risk of going with the flow.”8  Lakonishok, Shleifer, and 
Vishny (1992) mention the agency problems of institutional asset management. Growth 
stocks are easier to justify to sponsors, and are unlikely to become subject to financial 
distress in the near future. Institutional investors are aware of the danger that their 
sponsors could withdraw from the fund if it underperformed the market or other peer 
group funds for even short-time periods. They are often under pressure to concentrate 
on short-term strategies which are less risky and unlikely to generate performance 
deviating too much from the benchmark. That is why they usually stick to investing in 
growth stocks. 
  
Since 2000, value stocks have outperformed growth stocks, while during 1990s growth 
stocks were performing better than value stocks. Investors usually choose value stocks 
during bad market periods because evidence has shown that recessions do not hurt 
value stocks as much as they do growth stocks. On the other hand, booming markets 
are periods when value stocks miss a lot, while growth stocks generate significantly 
higher returns. In the end, all empirical studies have shown that value stocks still 
outperform growth stocks in the long run. 
 
2.4 Value Investing versus Efficient Market Hypothesis 
 
The investing philosophy depends on the perceptions about market behavior, i.e. on 
whether investors see the market as efficient or inefficient. 
                                            
8
 cf Browne, C., “The Little Book of Value Investing”, 2006, p. 148. 
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The Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) states that all available information on the 
market (including financial news, researches, political, economic, social events and so 
on), is already incorporated in the stock price. Since everyone has access to the same 
information, no investor has an opportunity to beat the market. The prices are assumed 
to be random making it impossible for investors to predict them. The efficient market is 
the world of rational investors where the stocks have fair prices at any time. 
 
Value investing is based on the principles opposed to those of EMH, assuming that the 
prices can be overpriced or underpriced. A number of investors, who have outperformed 
the market and have made millions following this philosophy, are an obvious proof that it 
is possible to achieve returns superior to the market. They believe there are some 
predictable anomalies (phenomenon that cannot be explained) which allow for 
outperformance. Some of them are: January effect (it argues that usually in January 
better results can be achieved) and “Blue Monday on Wall Street” (it argues that prices 
are higher the day before and after the weekend). Another group of inefficiencies is 
found to be a consequence of investor psychology influencing his decision making 
process and stock prices. It is researched and analyzed by behavioral finance.  
 
The EMH though does not exclude existence of market anomalies – only explains them 
by randomness of the stock prices. That is, it states that the prices are sometimes 
overvalued or undervalued because they deviate randomly from their mean so the 
investors who catch for these occasions are considered to have luck. Their success is 
due to the tails of standard deviation and as such unlikely to be achieved again with 
certainty. As a result of a random deviation, it is assumed that the stocks have equal 
probability of being overpriced or underpriced at any point in time. 
 
The EMH states furthermore, that even though there are anomalies they will disappear 
as investors seeking the profits continue to exploit them. This is exactly one of the 
conditions for the market to become efficient. While trying to beat the market, investors 
actually make it efficient by trading on inefficiency. In that sense the market can be 
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observed as a “self-correcting mechanism”9 where inefficiencies disappear as investors 
find them. 
 
As an answer to the EMH postulate that those investors who outperform the market do 
not do it out of skill but are lucky to catch for the randomness of the stock prices, Warren 
Buffett in his speech on the fiftieth anniversary of the publication of the Graham and 
Dodd’s “Security Analysis” (1934) asks whether it is really a luck or do all these investors 
have actually something in common. He made some examination and found that seven 
of such successful investors have either studied under Benjamin Graham at Columbia 
Business School or have worked for him. So they all had the same grounding and 
methodology, and differed only in the way of applying them. Can this really be result of a 
lucky circumstance?  
 
Value investors reject the Modern Portfolio Theory (MPT) and its Capital Asset Pricing 
Model, stating that it wrongly takes historical volatility as a proxy for risk. They reject the 
whole statistical approach of the MPT, finding standard deviation, beta and alpha 
misleading. For example, a substantial fall in a stock price, the investors following the 
MPT would see as increasing volatility of the stock even though a company has good 
fundamentals. Value investors, on the other hand, would see the stock as a potential 
bargain. 
 
The EMH and value investors agree that it becomes more and more difficult to make 
advantage of some inefficiency as more and more investors are able to replicate it. The 
truth is, as new technologies are being developed, the access to information is much 
easier and prices can be much quickly adjusted to news. This makes the markets more 
efficient and brings difficulties to value investors. But, a caution should be taken of the 
quality of information as it is the main source of inefficiencies in the market. After all, one 
of the main propositions of the EMH says that a probability of finding inefficiencies 
increases with the information and transaction costs.  
 
                                            
9
 cf Damodaran, A., “Investment Philosophies“, 2003, p. 143 
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Every single investor agrees that the market cannot be absolutely efficient or absolutely 
inefficient. This is based on the fact that if the market was fully efficient, there would not 
be extraordinary profits generated from beating the market. On the other hand, if the 
market was always inefficient, then everyone would succeed in achieving excess 
returns. 
 
2.5 Passive versus Active Value Approach 
 
While an essential idea of all value investors remains the same, there are different 
techniques they use to screen for potential value stocks. Some are more passive and 
simply use specific criteria to take position in an attractive company, while others adopt 
more activist approach where they use their shareholder power to change the way of 
running company’s business.  
 
The passive screener approach originates from Benjamin Graham who explained this 
technique in his book “Security Analysis” (1934). Passive screeners use the quantitative 
factors in their fundamental analysis, looking for the stocks that fulfill specific criteria like 
low price-to-earnings ratio, high dividend-yield and so on. 
 
However, it is clear that today it is not enough to valuate investment based only on 
specific value screens – that would leave to having too many investors achieving better 
performance than the market. There are several reasons for that. One of them is that 
investors often forget to diversify enough their portfolio. They concentrate on only one 
financial ratio, the one that is low for the firms from one specific industry group. On the 
other hand, using multiple ratios as potential screens also has its disadvantages since 
using of one of them can undercut the effectiveness of the other one. High tax liabilities 
can also be a problem, which is the case with portfolios containing stocks with high 
dividends and low price-to-earnings ratios. 
 
As opposed to the passive strategies, an activist value strategy does not invest in 
undervalued companies waiting for their management to make a turnaround. It rather 
takes a significant position that allows for an active involvement in creating new 
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business approaches. The evidence has shown that after changing the management or 
the way it runs the business, high returns can be earned only if the company’s stocks 
have done badly as a result of an incompetent management and if there is an 
improvement potential. According to Damodaran’s study in “Investment Philosophies” 
(2003), changes in management are generally viewed as good news, and therefore 
increase the prices. Moreover, the impact of these changes on prices is greatest if the 
changes are forced. This is usually the case if returns were negative.  
 
Warren Buffett’s strategy can be categorized as an activist strategy. He invests in a 
company, and then tries to make it more valuable by influencing its management and its 
way of running the business. As opposed to Graham who stuck to the quantitative 
factors, Buffett extended his approach to a significant use of the qualitative factors. He 
analyzes businesses now more subjective than Graham did. He searches the high 
quality businesses with the great earning power and competitive advantage over their 
competitors.  
 
In general, value investors nowadays usually conduct some more research regarding 
the qualitative variables of a company and industry in order to find out whether the stock 
is cheap for a reason. The qualitative factors typically used are: target market factors, 
industry conditions, corporate governance, business model, management of a company, 
brand-name recognition, patents, proprietary technology etc. To gain the necessary 
information about individual companies, the investment analysts and portfolio managers 
also visit the companies, suppliers, competitors and meet with senior management (one-
to-one or small-group meetings). Each firm’s estimated value based on a qualitative and 
quantitative valuation along with the expected price target are then compared to other 
firms from the peer group in order to identify the most attractive ones.  
 
2.6 Value Screens 
 
The core value investing strategy has still remained using the “screens” to identify good 
investments. Since the information needed to calculate the screens is easily found 
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today, the most important thing is to choose the right ones as valuation criteria. In this 
subchapter I analyze four mostly used value screens (they are also incorporated in the 
empirical part of my work): price-to-book, price-to-earnings, price-to-sales ratio and 
dividend yield. 
 
2.6.1 Price-To-Book Ratio 
 
The price-to-book ratio (P/B) is a fundamental variable that compares market value of a 
stock to its book value. It is also known as the price-equity ratio. It is calculated by 
dividing the market share price by its latest quarter’s book value. Another way to 
calculate it is to divide the company’s market capitalization by its total book value. Book 
value of company’s equity can be found on the balance sheet as the difference between 
book value of assets and the book value of liabilities. The intangible assets such as 
brand name, goodwill or patents, are not incorporated in this value. If the share price is 
lower than the book value, it means that either the asset value is overstated and it could 
possibly face a downward correction by the market or the company has a very poor 
return on its assets (ROA). In the first case, investors are likely to face negative returns. 
In the second case, if a company has a good management it is possible to make 
turnaround and give positive returns. The P/B ratio under 1 is considered to be low. The 
companies with high P/B ratios reflect the high expectations of investors and generally 
have high earnings growth rates. This ratio is useful to compare companies with the 
negative earnings since the P/E ratio does not work in that case. 
 
The P/B ratio has also shortcomings that should be taken into consideration. It is best 
used for the capital intensive and financial businesses, i.e. the companies that have 
many assets such as banking institutions, manufacturing industries and so on. It does 
not have much sense to look for a book value of the service-oriented companies that 
have few tangible assets on the balance sheet. A book value is not very useful for the 
companies with high debt levels which create artificially high P/B values. The assets of 
these companies are then understated making their P/B ratio meaningless. The 
acquisitions and serial acquisitions almost always increase the book value and lower the 
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P/B ratio because the new assets are reported on the balance sheet at the full price 
paid. However, a huge part of the book value is stated in the goodwill and tangibles that 
should be subtracted to get more meaningful P/B.  
 
The P/B ratios should always be compared within the same industry. A low P/B can 
indicate that the industry at large has a low P/B. But if a company’s P/B ratio is low 
compared to others in the industry then it might by undervalued or the company may be 
performing poorly. Some industries, such as insurance companies, have low P/B ratios 
because they are either cyclical or generate low return on equity (ROE). Since ROE is a 
key growing indicator, it should be observed together with P/B ratio. If a company has 
high P/B ratio, its ROE should also be high. Otherwise a combination of high P/B and 
low ROE would be an indicator of overvalued growth stocks. A low P/B indicates that the 
company will have both poor ROE and ROA. This results from the fact that the firms with 
a ROE lower than their cost of equity should trade at a discount on the book value. 
  
Another important point which investors should keep in mind is that companies with low 
P/B (or with the prices below their book value) are possibly performing badly and could 
go out of business. In this sense, a P/B could be used as a measure of risk and 
investors should carefully compare possible additional returns on these companies with 
associated possible risk. The stocks chosen on the low P/B ratio basis should therefore 
have the reasonable risk exposure and ROE. 
 
The P/B ratio is an easy-to-calculate investing metric but should not be used in isolation 
when identifying undervalued companies. 
 
2.6.2 Price-To-Earnings Ratio 
 
The price-to-earnings ratio (also known as “price multiple” or “earnings multiple”) is 
probably the most widely used investing tool. It is computed by dividing the current 
market price of one company’s share by the earnings per share (EPS). It is the price an 
investor is paying for $1 of the company’s earnings. The EPS are the company’s after-
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tax profit divided by the number of outstanding shares. The share price is the market 
capitalization divided by the number of shares. If two companies are both selling a share 
for the same price, it does not mean they are equally expensive. For example, if 
companies A and B have the price per share $60, and company A has reported 
earnings of $20 per share while company B has reported earnings $10 per share, then 
the P/E ratio for company A would be 3, and for company B would be 6. We can 
conclude that company A is cheaper than company B on relative basis because the 
investor would get as twice as more earnings from company A ($20 reported earnings) 
for every share purchased. 
   
The P/E ratios are usually computed using the earnings per share from the last four 
quarters and are called trailing or current P/E. Occasionally, the EPS figure can be taken 
from estimated earnings expected over the next four quarters. This is called projected, 
forward or leading P/E. There is also a third variation that uses the sum of the last two 
actual quarters and the estimates of the next two quarters. The trailing P/E uses actual 
historical data, while the other two variations are based on estimates that are not very 
precise.  
 
The companies that have a negative EPS deal in different ways with the P/E ratios. 
Some report negative P/E, some P/E that equals 0, and others simply say that P/E does 
not exist. The P/E is probably best viewed over time, looking for a trend. The companies 
that have higher earnings and are expected to grow in the future usually have higher 
P/E than companies in decline. Holding all else equal, the stocks with a risk perceived to 
be higher have lower P/E ratios. To choose the right stocks, investors should make sure 
that there exist at least minimal growth potential or growth rates not lower than an 
industry average. The risk should also not be lower than the average, and it could be 
screened for by using, for example, standard deviation or debt-to-equity ratio. 
 
Besides comparing the P/E ratios of companies in the same sector, it is also possible to 
compare average P/E ratios of different industries in order to determine which ones are 
underpriced or overpriced. Different sectors have different P/E ratios that are considered 
to be “normal”. For example, technology companies sell at an average of 40 P/E while 
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textile industry has a quite smaller average P/E of 8. These differences between 
industries arise from different expectations of their businesses. Those sectors that trade 
at higher P/E ratios usually have higher returns on equity and higher growth rates. The 
industries with higher perceived risk attract lower P/E ratios. If all the companies in the 
industry have an average P/E above the historical average, this means that the industry 
is overpriced. 
 
Sometimes, the companies have one-time events that affect net earnings (for example, 
selling one division for more than its book value and recording the difference as a 
positive in net earnings). This could make the P/E ratio useless and misleading. Besides 
speculation, another problem with the earnings is their possible volatility typically related 
to the cyclical industry. In such the cases, normalized earnings could be used to identify 
the cheap stocks. This is calculated by averaging earnings across an economic cycle.  
 
Investors should be careful when comparing current P/E ratio of a company with its 
historical average. Caution should be taken especially with average P/E ratios from the 
late 1990s because during the market bubbles P/Es can be overinflated for some 
periods of time. In a low-interest-rate environment, the P/E ratios tend to be higher 
because a company’s cost of capital is lower. 
 
The P/E ratio should never be used alone to judge the value of an asset. Some other 
factors should be taken into consideration to avoid misuse of the PE ratio: interest rates, 
growth rate of a company, earnings (may not reflect company’s current position), 
industry and so on. Only if difference between company’s and average P/E in the same 
industry cannot be explained by these variables, the company can be considered as 
undervalued or overvalued.  
 
2.6.3 Price-To-Sales Ratio 
 
The price-to-sales ratio (P/S) is another valuation metric calculated by dividing a stock’s 
current price per share by its revenue per share for the last four fiscal quarters, or by 
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dividing the company’s market capitalization by its revenues for the last four quarters. It 
tells how much an investor pays for 1$ of company’s sales. The companies with a P/S 
ratio less than 1 are considered an attractive investment. A low P/S suggests a company 
with a turnaround potential, while a high P/S suggests that this turnaround has already 
passed (if ever happened).  
 
The P/S ratios vary across different industries so one should always compare the 
companies from the same sector or sub-sector. If a company has a P/S less than 1, 
while other companies from the same industry have P/S higher than 1, it means that the 
company’s shares are valued at a discount compared to other companies (unless that 
company is going out of business). The cyclical industries tend to have the periods when 
there is almost no earnings generated but it does not mean that the shares of those 
companies are worthless. In this case, the P/E ratio cannot be used to asses the shares 
so a P/S ratio comes into play. 
  
Since the earnings are not very reliable financial indicator and are easier to manipulate 
than sales revenue, many investors see the P/S ratio as more indicative of performance 
than the P/E ratio. However, the P/S ratio can also be unreliable if investors do not look 
at other relevant criteria like the debt levels, growth prospects or profit margins. 
 
The firms with a low P/S ratio are likely to be the most highly levered firms. If a company 
has a low P/S ratio but high debt levels, there is a possibility that it is going to issue new 
shares to pay off the debt, expanding by this way its market capitalization and increasing 
the P/S ratio. One possible way to deal with a high leverage problem is to replace the 
market value of equity by the enterprise value. The enterprise value is calculated by 
adding to equity market value of debt and subtracting cash and marketable securities.  
  
Another possible problem could be the fact that a company can book the sales for which 
it has not yet provided goods or services, or before the customer actually paid for it. This 
usually leads to inflated sales and earnings lowering therefore the P/S and P/E ratios. 
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Just as the P/E ratio should be considered with an earnings growth, the P/S ratio should 
be considered with net profit margin. This is calculated by dividing the net income by 
total sales. The P/S ratio is particularly useful for young growing companies and those 
with negative earnings, whereas it is not very appropriate for the service companies that 
do not really have sales.  
 
2.6.4 Dividend Yield 
 
This financial ratio shows how much shareholders yield from the stock in the form of 
dividends relative to the company’s share price. The higher is the dividend yield, the 
higher is the cash flow received by an investor for each dollar invested in equity. The 
companies with the high and increasing dividends are likely to possess high quality. 
They are usually mature and well-established companies as opposed to young growth 
companies which pay low or no dividends. 
 
Caution should be taken when dividend yield is high. It could be a case that it is due to a 
depressed price which could lead to the dividend cut or even dividend elimination. 
Investors should make sure that a company has enough earnings to cover the 
dividends. If most of the earnings are used to cover dividends, this means that a 
company cannot reinvest much in itself and as a result will not have a high growth rate. 
   
One possible way of determining the riskiness of high dividend stock is to calculate the 
dividend payout ratio. This can be done by dividing a company’s dividends by its 
earnings. That shows how much of company’s earnings are used for paying the 
dividends. The risk-averse investors should seek for the stocks whose dividends are 
more than covered by earnings, i.e. whose payout ratio is not too close to 100 %. The 
margin of safety concept says that the dividends should be less than two-thirds of 
earnings.  
 
Investors should also examine the company’s history of the cash flows and earnings to 
make sure that there has not been a longer negative trend in the past quarters. It could 
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be a case that a company did not earn more than its dividend in the last couple of 
quarters but at the same time has the positive and growing cash flows which could make 
the company able to pay out and, furthermore, to increase its dividends. The debt 
proportions are also important to observe in order to identify the safe businesses. One 
should be avoiding the companies that have the significant short-term cash needs as a 
result of a high debt. These needs can be calculated by dividing company’s current 
assets with its current liabilities. If the current ratio is two or more, the company can be 
considered to be safe. 
 
One of the drawbacks of this strategy is that it is usually related to high tax costs 
because the dividends pay higher tax rate than the capital gains. 
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3 Empirical Evidence on the Value Investing Performance 
 
There is considerable number of empirical studies today which provide clear evidence 
on a superior performance of value stocks as compared to growth stocks in the long run. 
Furthermore, they also provide a proof for the effectiveness of the value screens 
described in the previous section when it comes to identifying undervalued stocks.  
 
3.1 Evidence on Book-To-Market Ratio 
 
Most of the researches on value premium were carried out based on a book-to-market 
(B/M) ratio.  
 
Rosenberg, Reid and Lanstein (1985) made a survey for the period 1980-1984 using a 
sample of the stocks which contained 1400 of the largest firms from the COMPUSTAT 
database. Most of the firms were listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). 
These researchers achieved highly significant results in explaining abnormal average 
stock returns using the B/M ratio. They showed that the stocks with high B/M ratio 
generated much higher returns than the stocks with low B/M ratio. 
 
Fama and French (1992) examination of the US stock market showed that the B/M ratio 
explained more of the cross-sectional variation of stock returns than any other 
fundamental variable used. They found a strong cross-sectional relation between the 
average returns and book-to-market equity in the 1963-1990 period. Average returns 
rose from 0.30 % for the lowest B/M portfolio to 1.83 % for the highest, generating a 
difference of 1.53 % per month. They did not include the firms with negative book equity 
in their tests. 
 
Damodaran (2003) carried out an analysis of all NYSE stocks based on the B/M and 
return-on-equity from 1982 to 1991. This analysis was consistent with a theory that 
combination of the high book-to-market, low default risk and high return-on-equity firms 
should yield less risky stocks than the high book-to-market firms. At the end of each 
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year, he created two portfolios: undervalued (including high B/M and high return-on-
equity stocks) and overvalued portfolios (including low B/M and low return-on-equity 
stocks). The average annual returns that he got are summarized in the table below. 
 
Table 3.1: Returns on Mismatched Portfolios: Price-To-Book and ROE 
  
Year Undervalued Portfolio Overvalued Portfolio S & P 500 
1982 37.64% 14.64% 40.35% 
1983 34.89% 3.07% 0.68% 
1984 20.52% -28.82% 15.43% 
1985 46.55% 30.22% 30.97% 
1986 33.61% 0.60% 24.44% 
1987 -8.80% -0.56% -2.69% 
1988 23.52% 7.21% 9.67% 
1989 37.50% 16.55% 18.11% 
1990 -26.71% -10.98% 6.18% 
1991 74.22% 28.76% 31.74% 
1982-91 25.60% 10.61% 17.49% 
 
Source: Damodaran, A., “Investment Philosophies”, 2003, p. 232. 
 
3.2 Evidence on Price-To-Earnings Ratio 
 
The P/E ratio has also attracted a lot of attention in the academic researches as it 
proved to be a strong indicator of the company’s fundamental value. 
 
Basu (1977) was first who tested the US stock market based on the P/E ratio. He used a 
sample of 1400 industrial firms from NYSE covering the period from 1956 to 1971. His 
study showed that the stocks with low P/E significantly outperformed those with high 
P/E, yielding an average annual return 7 % higher than return of the highest P/E 
portfolio group.  
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Josef Lakonishok, Robert Vishney and Andrei Shleifer (1994) have done an impressive 
work presented in the “Contrarian Investment, Extrapolation and Risk”. They ranked all 
the stocks from both the New York and American Stock Exchange by P/E ratio in 
deciles. Each portfolio was held for five years and then sold. They found that over the 
five-year period, the stocks with low P/E ratio earned almost twice as much return as the 
stocks with high P/E ratio.  
 
Fama and French (1992) tested portfolios based on E/P from July 1963 to December 
1990. Since the analysis does not make sense when the earnings are negative (they 
cannot be taken as a proxy for the earnings forecasts in that case), they only included 
the firms with positive earnings, while for those with negative earnings they added a 
dummy variable. The results showed that the average returns increased with an E/P 
ratio when it was positive. They also found that the firms with negative earnings had 
higher average returns. 
 
3.3 Evidence on Price-To-Sales Ratio 
 
Unfortunately, there is not so much evidence on a P/S ratio as compared to the P/B and 
P/E ratio. One of direct studies was carried out by Senchack and Martin (1987). They 
used a sample of 400-450 firms each quarter from New York Stock Exchange and 
American Stock Exchange for the reporting period of 1975-1984. They found that the 
low P/S portfolios earned superior returns relative to the equally weighted market 
portfolio but not relative to low P/E portfolios. The low P/E portfolios had a better 
performance measured both on an absolute and a risk-adjusted basis, generating higher 
returns in 68 % of the quarters studied. Furthermore, they also found that low P/S 
portfolios were more biased towards including smaller firms. 
 
James P. O'Shaughnessy has done considerable work in this field, testing both the P/S 
and P/E ratios. In his work “What Works on Wall-Street” (1996), he argued that the P/S 
ratio is the strongest single determinant of the excessive stock returns, stronger even 
than the P/E ratio.   
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3.4 Evidence on Dividend Yield 
 
Most of the studies related to the dividend yield variable gave positive results, but also 
showed that a relationship between the average returns and this value screen is not as 
consistent as between average returns and P/E or P/B ratio. 
 
Using raw data from K. French, Damodaran (2003) presented results of testing portfolios 
classified by a dividend yield between 1952 and 2001. In the periods of 1952-1971 and 
1991-2001, portfolios with the highest dividend yield generated higher returns than 
portfolios with the lowest dividend yield. However, between 1971 and 1990 results were 
reversed: The highest yield portfolios earned lower returns than the lowest yield 
portfolios. 
 
One of the most popular dividend yield strategies is the “Dogs of the Dow” strategy 
which is devoted to picking annually ten Dow Jones Industrial Average stocks with the 
highest dividend yield. The stocks are always included in the portfolio at the beginning of 
the year, and hold until the end of the year. Since 1973, they have yielded an average 
annual return of 17.7 %, while the Dow Jones Industrial Average has earned 11.9 % for 
the same period.10 McQueen, Shields, and Thorley (1997) conducted a profound 
analysis of this strategy using a sample period from 1946 to 1995. Their results 
confirmed superior performance of “dogs” as compared to Dow-30 over 50 years period 
(the Dow-10 had average return of 16.77 %, while the Dow-30 earned 13.71 %). 
However, they also found that an excess return of the Dow-10 was associated with a 
higher risk (its standard deviation was 19.10 % as compared to 16.64 % for the Dow-
30). This is exactly the point which the critics use as the argumentation against this 
strategy. They argue that the excess return would be eliminated after adjusting for risk 
and taxes.  
 
The chart below provides an insight into performance of Dogs of the Dow portfolio over 
years comparing it with some of the largest US equity funds and indexes.   
  
                                            
10
 cf www.dogsofthedow.com 
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Figure 3.1: Performance comparison from 2000 to 2006 
 
         
       Source: www.dogsofthedow.com 
 
3.5 International Evidence 
 
Numerous studies have tested the cross-sectional predictability of the US stock returns. 
However, some researchers have challenged the reliability of such studies, stating that 
certain patterns of the stock returns could be time-specific and market-specific. This has 
motivated some academicians to extend their analysis to the markets outside of the US. 
 
Chan, Hamao, and Lakonishok (1991) analyzed Japanese stock market in the period of 
1971-1988. They related cross-sectional return variations to four variables: book-to-
market, earnings-to-price, size and cash flow yield. Book-to-market and cash flow yield 
seemed to have the strongest positive relationship with expected returns. Of all 
variables, book-to-market was found to be economically and statistically most important. 
As opposed to other studies done before theirs, they did not find an evidence for a 
strong earnings yield effect after controlling for other variables. 
 
 34
Capaul, Rowley, and Sharpe (1993) provided strong evidence on the excess returns of 
value stocks over growth stocks in the six major security markets (US, UK, Germany, 
Japan, Switzerland and France) from January 1981 to June 1992. They classified 
portfolios using a price-to-book ratio (value portfolios contained stocks with low P/B and 
growth portfolios contained high P/B stocks). The results showed that the low P/B stocks 
outperformed the high P/B stocks. Moreover, a superior performance of the low P/B 
stocks, indicating high predictable power of the P/B ratio, was evident after adjusting for 
risk too. A difference between value and growth returns was substantially larger in other 
countries than in the US. The test on a statistical significance on a global basis 
confirmed this finding. The differences, however, were not equally significant for every 
country or at the same time. That is why they suggest that “an investor considering a ‘tilt’ 
toward value stocks would be well advised to implement a policy globally, rather than 
within a single country or even a single region”11. 
    
Fama and French (1997) found that value stocks tend to have superior returns to growth 
stocks in the international markets too. A research that they carried out rejected the 
theory of Black (1993) and MacKinlay (1995) which says that the value premium is 
sample-specific, i.e. that the higher returns of the US-value stocks were only a chance 
result that is unlikely to happen again. Fama and French (1997) studied the market, 
value and growth returns for the US and 12 major countries in Europe, Australia and Far 
East (so they constructed 13 portfolios for the individual countries). Their results provide 
strong evidence on the superior value returns for the portfolios formed on the book-to-
market ratio, earnings-to-price ratio, cash-flow-to-price ratio and dividend yield in the 
period from 1975 to 1995. Among portfolios selected on the B/M, E/P and C/P, 12 out of 
13 value portfolios outperformed growth portfolios. The value premiums are not so much 
consistent for the portfolios formed on dividend yield. However, even in this case 10 out 
of 13 portfolios generated the positive value-growth premiums. The global value 
portfolios had average returns from 3.09 % to 5.09 % per year higher than average 
returns on the global market portfolio, and from 5.56 % to 7.65 % per year higher than 
those of the global growth portfolios.  
                                            
11
 cf Capaul, Rowley, and Sharpe, “International Value and Growth Stock Returns”, Financial Analysts 
Journal 49 (1), 1993, p. 32. 
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4 Explanation of the Value Premium 
 
While investors generally agree that value stocks outperform growth stocks in the long 
run, their opinions differ when it comes to explanation of the value premium sources.  
 
One explanation is that the higher value returns are compensation for a higher 
systematic risk. Therefore, in order to generate superior returns, investors must take on 
an additional risk. As opposed to the traditional EMH explanation, behavioral finance 
assumes that it is rather people’s systematical judgment errors that cause both 
underpricing and overpricing of the stocks. The financial markets are assumed to be 
inefficient most of the time while the market efficiency comes up as a special case, 
unlikely to hold under the plausible circumstances.    
 
4.1 Risk-based Explanation 
 
Academic researchers, Fama and French, shaped the investment world in 1992 by 
providing strong evidence against the Modern Portfolio Theory (MPT) and Sharpe-
Lintner-Black (SLB) model. Market risk is widely accepted risk factor but, according to 
Fama and French, it failed to explain the realized returns. They say: “If assets are priced 
rationally, our results suggest that stock risks are multidimensional.”12  
 
Generally, they divide the stocks into four groups: small value, large value, small growth 
and large growth stocks.13 According to their theory, each of these asset classes are 
exposed to the different risk levels, which results in the different stock returns. The value 
companies are in general riskier than growth companies since they, for example, have 
higher cost of capital. Moreover, the small companies are always associated with higher 
risk than large companies because they are not able to deal in a proper way with the 
financial troubles. As a result of these postulates, the small value stocks should have the 
                                            
12
 cf Fama, E. and French, K., “The Cross Section of Expected Stock Returns“, Journal of Finance 47 (2), 
1992, p. 428. 
13
 This is general classification used for the portfolio selection. The analysis that Fama and French carried 
out in 1992 contained more combined portfolios using the value and size criterions.  
 36
higher returns than any other of these asset groups. Both value groups should have the 
higher returns than the two growth groups. The small growth stocks should outperform 
the large growth stocks. Fama and French model, however, failed to prove the latter 
one. The small growth class had the worst performance of these four classes in their 
empirical research.14   
 
4.1.1 The Three Factor Model 
 
Criticizing the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) which defines market risk as the only 
risk factor explaining excess returns, Fama said in 1992 that “beta as the sole variable 
explaining returns on stocks is dead”.15 Namely, in “The Cross-Section of Expected 
Stock Returns”, Fama and French state that their empirical analysis failed to find the 
relationship between beta and average returns in the period of 1963-1990, as predicted 
by the MPT. In addition, they identified two more relevant risk factors which they think 
are the most significant in explaining the value premiums.  
 
The second risk factor they identified is associated with a company size. They found that 
the small company stocks, as related to a higher risk, deliver better results than the 
large company stocks. The third risk factor they included to their studies is the factor 
associated with value of a company. Value is represented by the book-to-market ratio. 
The stocks with a higher fundamental value than their market price usually outperform 
those who have low book-to-market ratio and are therefore overpriced.  
 
Together with the market risk, these two factors comprise The Three Factor Model: 
 
ra = rf + ßa(rm – rf) + saSMB + haHML 
 
ßa – asset exposure to market risk 
sa – level of exposure to size risk 
                                            
14
 cf Fama, E. and French, K., “The Cross Section of Expected Stock Returns“, Journal of Finance 47 (2), 
1992, p. 446. 
15
 cf http://answers.google.com/answers/threadview?id=273817 
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ha – level of exposure to value risk   
 
While the univariate analysis of a simple relation between beta and average return failed 
to show this relation, Fama and French succeeded in proving a strong univariate relation 
of the size and book-to-market equity with the average returns. Moreover, they proved 
that these relations hold in the multivariate analysis too: A strong positive relation 
between the book-to-market and returns, as well as a strong negative relation between 
the size and returns are present even when included together or with other variables in a 
regression. 
  
They also found that a book-to-market ratio had a stronger role in explaining average 
returns. Comparing returns between the companies with negative or high book-to-
market on the one side, and those with low book-to-market on another side, they have 
come to a conclusion that variations are related to relative distress. This means that the 
higher average returns for the companies with negative book equity and high book-to-
market ratio are due to poor earnings prospects of these companies. When comparing 
size with book-to-market ratio, they showed that there is a negative correlation between 
these two variables. For example, the small stocks typically have the low prices and high 
book-to-market equity because they have poor earnings prospects. On the other side, 
the large stocks have higher prices and lower book-to-market equity because they 
usually have good earnings prospects. We can see that both size and book-to-market 
equity are related to the economic fundamentals. 
 
In order to explain these two risk factors added, they constructed two models: Small 
Minus Big (SMB) for the size and High Minus Low (HML) for the value risk. For these 
purposes, they divided the stocks into three groups based on a book-to-market ratio, 
and two groups based on market equity. They explained this as due to their finding that 
“book-to-market equity has a stronger role in average stock returns than size”16. Each of 
the size groups they divided into three groups again, in a way that both small and large 
stock groups contained also stocks with low, medium and high book-to-market ratio. In 
                                            
16
 cf Fama, E. and French, K., “Common risk factors in the returns on stocks and bonds“, Journal of 
Financial Economics 33, 1993, p. 9. 
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the end, they got six combined portfolios: small size/low book-to-market (S/L), small 
size/medium book-to-market (S/M), small size/high book-to-market (S/H), big size/low 
book-to-market (B/L), big size/medium book-to-market (B/M) and big size/high book-to-
market (B/H). 
 
The SMB measures monthly size premium, i.e. the difference between an average 
return of 50 % of the smallest stocks and an average return of 50 % of the largest stocks 
each month. In order to capture for return variations between small and big stocks, the 
comparing portfolios have the same weighted-average book-to-market ratios. This is 
how they avoided having a book-to-market ratio to influence results. 
 
The HML measures monthly value premium, i.e. the difference between an average 
return of 30 % of the stocks with the highest book-to-market ratio and an average return 
of 30 % of the stocks with the lowest book-to-market ratio each month. The two 
portfolios are constructed in a similar way as the SMB portfolios, i.e. they are equally 
weighted on the size to make sure that behavior of the average monthly returns reflects 
solely the high-low book-to-market differences excluding at the same time an influence 
of the size effect. 
 
By applying these models, Fama and French (1993) succeeded to confirm what they 
have found earlier: A relation between the book-to-market ratio and the average returns 
is more consistent than relation between the size and the average returns. The average 
monthly returns increased with the book-to-market ratio within every size portfolio. For 
some reason however, the average returns of the lowest book-to-market portfolio did not 
decrease from the small to the big size portfolios. In every other group they found a 
negative relation between size and average returns. Their regressions showed that all 
the three risk factors capture the common variation in the stock returns. However, the 
excess market return which they used as a proxy for the market factor, did not capture 
substantial variation when used as the only risk factor. In a contrary, the results are 
much more convincing when using either the SMB and the HML without market or all 
three factors together. The three-factor regression has shown that very strong common 
variation was captured: It produced R² higher than 0.9 for 21 out of 25 portfolios. At the 
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same time, the market alone produced R² higher than 0.9 for only two portfolios. 
 
They also examined the average returns behavior using portfolios formed on the 
earnings-to-price and dividend-to-price ratios. The results were similar to those with the 
book-to-market and size factors: The highest returns were generated by the firms with a 
negative and very high earnings-to-price ratio. Furthermore, the returns increased as an 
earnings-to-price ratio increased across the portfolios. The one-factor model, on the 
other hand, failed to explain the relation between returns and earnings to price. The 
reason for that, according to Fama and French (1993), is that “market ßs for the 
positive-E/P portfolios are all close to 1.0, so the one-factor model cannot explain the 
positive relation between E/P and average return”.17 They also found a positive relation 
between E/P and B/M. Small average returns of the low E/P stocks are typical for the 
stocks with low B/M. They have high earnings, which leads to high prices relative to their 
book equity. High E/P stocks show the same characteristic associated with high B/M 
stocks: Low earnings resulting in low prices, and high returns resulting from distress.   
 
Concerning portfolios formed on dividend-to-price ratio, the spread in average returns is 
much weaker than for E/P portfolios. The three-factor regression has shown that low 
D/P ratios are typical for growth stocks which have low average returns, while high D/P 
ratios are associated with distress producing high average returns. 
 
The Three Factor Model makes it able for investors to choose as to how much they want 
to get exposed to each of three risk factors, depending on the level of returns they 
expect to reach. 
 
4.1.2 Economic Arguments for the Cross-Section of Expected Returns 
 
There is a point that Fama and French were not sure about. It is an economic 
explanation for the ability of two variables, size and book-to-market ratio, to explain the 
                                            
17
 cf Fama, E. and French, K., “Common risk factors in the returns on stocks and bonds“, Journal of 
Financial Economics 33, 1993, p. 49. 
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cross-section of the average stock returns. They suggest that there are two possible 
points of view, depending on whether we assume an asset pricing to be rational or 
irrational. 
 
In their tests Fama and French used two variables mentioned above as the proxies for a 
risk assuming that stocks are priced rationally. In that case, we could say that a distress 
factor is incorporated in the stock returns since distressed firms have poor earnings 
prospects and are, therefore, associated with the higher risks and higher returns. The 
book-to-market ratio could be seen as a direct indicator of the company’s earnings on 
the assets. The stocks with a higher book-to-market ratio are expected to have the 
higher returns because their equity is valued low by the market. 
 
On the other hand, a possibility of observing the market and its pricing as irrational 
cannot be excluded. This theory assumes that market occasionally overreacts to the 
relative prospects of the companies and that the book-to-market and size effects are a 
result of this overreaction. Not even Fama and French ignore this possibility: “It is also 
possible, however, that BE/ME just captures the unravelling … of irrational market 
whims about the prospects of firms.”18  
 
Fama and French deal in a more detail with the economical reasons of the common 
return variations in their “Size and Book-to-Market Factors in Earnings and Returns” 
(1995). In this work they examined whether the behavior of the stock prices is consistent 
with the earnings behavior. Once more they confirmed that both book-to-market equity 
and size are related to profitability. However, an interesting finding is that the size and 
profitability did not have a strong relation before recessions in 1981 and 1982. The low 
profits of the small firms after 1980 have therefore largely contributed to the size effect in 
the earnings. They have found a persistent property of the earnings related both to 
book-to-market equity and size. This conclusion is based on the evidence that “small 
                                            
18
 cf Fama, E. and French, K., “The Cross Section of Expected Stock Returns“, Journal of Finance 47 (2), 
1992, p. 429. 
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stocks have persistently lower EI/BE than big stocks”19, and that, for even a longer 
period, the low book-to-market stocks have higher earnings-to-equity than the high 
book-to-market stocks (four years before and at least five years after the portfolios were 
formed). As opposed to a size factor, they found a relation between book-to-market and 
earnings to be unconditional, as their both portfolios formed on the low book-to-market 
ratios were more profitable than the high book-to-market portfolios. This is why they 
state that a book-to-market factor is generally stronger indicator of profitability than a 
size factor. 
 
Fama and French (1995) have come to the same conclusion as Lakonishok, Schleifer, 
and Vishny (LSV, 1994) regarding earnings properties after a portfolio formation: They 
confirm that the earnings growth rates of both low and high book-to-market stocks tend 
to converge, i.e. they become similar in the years after a portfolio was formed. Their 
tests, however, do not confirm the LSV theory that the higher average returns of the high 
book-to-market stocks are result of an irrational asset pricing and the lack of market’s 
understanding of the growth rates convergence. In contrary, Fama and French state that 
the market understands the earnings growth rates behavior, and that it makes unbiased 
forecast of earnings after the portfolios are formed on the size and book-to-market ratio. 
Because only a long-term property (strong or poor) of the earnings has an impact on the 
stock prices and book-to-market ratio, they exclude the possibility of the irrational pricing 
and investor sentiment impact. They believe that these do not have a lot to do with the 
long-term earnings and profitability. 
 
Fama and French (1995), therefore, explain the higher risk premium of the high book-to-
market firms as a result of a higher distress risk. Those firms generally have common 
characteristics like persistently low earnings and high financial leverage. 
 
They succeeded in proving that the market and size factors in earnings explain the 
market and size factors in returns, but they failed to provide strong empirical evidence 
that exactly these factors explain also risk premiums associated with the size and book-
                                            
19
 cf Fama, E. and French, K., “Size and Book-to-Market Factors in Earnings and Returns”, Journal of 
Finance 50 (1), 1995, p. 136. 
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to-market equity. So, the question which economic variables drive the common 
variations in the average returns remained open.  
 
Griffin and Lemmon (2002) have provided an interesting analysis of a relation between 
book-to-market equity, distress risk and stock returns using a measure of the likelihood 
of bankruptcy as a proxy for distress risk. They ranked the firms with the highest 
financial distress in the high O-score quintile. Within this ranking they identified more 
firms with the low B/M ratios and high past stock returns than the firms with the high B/M 
ratios and low past stock returns. Ranking the firms based on their bankruptcy risk has 
led them to the results which only by part overlapped with those of Fama and French 
(1995): Within the low O-score firms, the high BE/ME firms have persistently lower 
earnings than the low BE/ME firms. On the other hand, the results for the highest O-
score quintile differ largely from Fama and French (1995) prediction: The low BE/ME 
firms with a high likelihood of bankruptcy have the earnings persistently below those of 
other low BE/ME firms. Their characteristics do not seem to be consistent with a high 
distress risk, since they have the high past stock returns and lower subsequent returns 
than those of the other low BE/ME firms. Furthermore, the returns of the high BE/ME O-
score firms are only slightly higher than the returns of other high BE/ME firms.  
 
Both low and high BE/ME stocks within a high O-score quintile are characterized by a 
low profitability and a high leverage; their returns are, however, widely dispersed. 
Among all quintiles, the firms with the highest distress risk had the largest differences in 
returns between high and low book-to-market securities. This was largely due to an 
underperformance of the low BE/ME stocks relative to all other groups. However, the 
Three Factor Model using the MTB (excess return on the value-weighted market 
portfolio), SMB and HML factors, did not support Fama and French (1995) prediction 
that the low returns of the highly distressed low BE/ME firms can be explained by a 
lower riskiness of these firms compared to other low BE/ME firms. One possible 
explanation that they examined coincides with the view of LSV (1994), La Porta (1996) 
and La Porta et al. (1997). It says that a return pattern of the low BE/ME firms 
mentioned above is due to a mispricing of investors. The mispricing again, is related to 
the characteristics of firms with a high distress risk. They found that those firms are 
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typically small ones, with the low current profits but a high sales growth, capital spending 
and investing in future growth opportunities. These firms are subject to the larger 
information asymmetries, and as such difficult to value by investors. Their low B/M ratios 
actually reflect wrongly expected improvements by the market. This assumes that the 
current earnings of these firms are only temporary weak and that their profits will 
increase in the future. Because of these expectations, they get awarded by the high 
multiples.  
 
Griffin and Lemmon argumentation of a mispricing differs from general prediction of 
behavioral finance advocates which says that investors extrapolate a current 
performance too far into the future. They say instead that "investors may underestimate 
the importance of information about current fundamentals and overestimate the payoffs 
from future growth opportunities".20 
 
Zhang (2005) supports a traditional risk-based explanation of value premium as 
suggested by Fama and French (1993, 1996) and relates a behavior of the expected 
returns to the economic fundamentals. His model is different in a way that he uses more 
fundamental determinants of the risk and expected return. A high spread between 
expected returns of the value and growth strategies he explains using the assets in 
place and growth options mechanism. The assets in place are riskier especially in bad 
times, because a price of risk is high. They are difficult to reduce by the value firms, 
because these firms face the higher costs in cutting than in an expanding capital. This is 
why there is a high-risk dispersion between the value and growth strategies in bad 
times. An expected value premium is much higher in bad times, since the value firms 
increase their unproductive capital stocks, unable to reduce them due to the higher 
costs. In good times, on the other hand, risk dispersion between the value and growth 
strategies is low. This is because the growth firms invest more in good times and, at the 
same time, previously unproductive capital of the value firms becomes productive. 
Consistently with Cohen et al. (2003), Zhang (2005) says that the value premium is the 
highest when a spread in the book-to-market ratios between value and growth stocks is 
                                            
20
 cf Griffin and Lemmon, “Book-To-Market Equity, Distress Risk and Stock Returns“, Journal of Finance 
57 (5), 2002, p. 2333. 
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wide. He has also found that the book-to-market and value spread are the positive 
predictors of the future industry returns, since an aggregate productivity (assumed to be 
the main driving force in the industry) is positively related to the book-to-market ratio and 
expected excess return. Moreover, a value spread has even higher predictive power as 
compared to book-to-market. Zhang's regression of the value-weighted industry return 
on the industry book-to-market and the value spread has led him to the conclusion that 
the industry cost of capital increases with the industry B/M ratio and with value spread 
within the industry. 
 
Zhang (2005) emphasizes that rational expectations approach has an advantage over 
the alternative theories such as behavioral finance in a way that the real economy is 
easier to measure than an investor sentiment. Moreover, the structural models 
theoretically have more robust predictions to the alternative assumptions. He argues 
that "neoclassical framework can be extended to link asset prices to other features of 
the real economy"21, and calls for further research in this area. 
 
4.1.3 Market Anomalies: Fama Defending Efficient Market Hypothesis 
 
In the theory of the Efficient Market Hypothesis, any patterns in the average returns that 
cannot be explained by the Capital Asset Pricing Model are called the market 
anomalies. One example would be either short-term or long-term post-event 
continuation of pre-event abnormal returns. In the behavioral finance theory such 
deviations from the "normal" returns are explained by the investors' overreaction. The 
market efficiency theory, on the other hand, sees these anomalies as a chance result. 
This chance generates the deviations from a zero expected value of the abnormal 
returns in both directions. This means that a general prediction is that apparent 
underreaction will be as frequent as overreaction. Consistently, the evidence has shown 
that a post-event continuation of the pre-event abnormal returns is about as frequent as 
their reversal. 
 
                                            
21
 cf Zhang, Lu, “The Value Premium“, Journal of Finance 60 (1), 2005, p.95. 
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Fama (1998) shows that, except continuation of the short-term returns, the anomalies 
largely disappear in a three factor model. The excess return is explained by the 
sensitivity of the portfolio return to three factors: excess return on a broad market 
portfolio (rm-rf), Small Minus Big (SMB) and High Minus Low (HML). The most long-term 
return anomalies tend to disappear as they are sensitive to methodology or statistical 
approaches used to measure them. They could not be attributed to a chance only if they 
were large enough. However, Fama (1998) argues that the most of them are actually 
shaky and, as such, likely to disappear or become marginal if the reasonable changes in 
methods used to estimate the abnormal returns are made. Fama and French (1996) 
have found that a return covariation of the stocks that were subject to an overreaction 
for the long term is associated with a risk premium. Furthermore, they show that the 
long-term reversals of DeBondt and Thaler (1985) are captured by a multifactor asset 
pricing model. Most of the studies of the long-term returns have provided an apparent 
overreaction as a result. However, according to Fama (1998), overreaction cannot be 
the whole story because a high distress premium persists for at least five years after a 
portfolio formation, while the mean reversion of the earnings growth is apparent much 
sooner. 
 
The general prediction of behavioral finance is that the long-term abnormal returns can 
be attributed to an investor overreaction. This assumption is based largely on the 
research done by DeBondt and Thaler in 1985. However, Fama (1998) argues that the 
market efficiency still cannot be replaced by this behavioral alternative since there are 
also the event studies that produced abnormal post-event long-term returns as a result 
of an underreaction. So, because an overreaction comes about as frequent as an 
underreaction, none of these alternatives can be considered as a dominant 
phenomenon. 
 
4.2 Behavioral Finance Explanation 
 
According to Lakonishok, Schleifer and Vishny (1994), a success of the value investing 
strategies lays in the fact that these strategies are contrarian to what they call “naive” 
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strategies (i.e. popular strategies). Some of these naive strategies extrapolate past 
earnings performance too far into the future; some assume a trend in the stock prices, 
while others overreact to either good or bad news and so on. This kind of a behavior 
leads to overselling of value stocks and their underpricing on the one hand, and 
overbuying of growth stocks and their overpricing on the other hand. The contrarian 
investors exploit a suboptimal behavior of the naive investors by investing more in the 
underpriced stocks and underinvesting in the overpriced stocks, which makes them able 
to outperform the market.  
 
4.2.1 Overreaction and Underreaction 
 
Overreaction and underreaction are probably two most important hypothesis of the 
behavioral explanation of the value premium. They are result of investors’ systematic 
mental mistakes. A psychological research has shown that these mistakes happen 
because a human brain uses shortcuts to solve complex problems and generate 
estimates, which usually leads to an incorrect data analysis. In other words, the longer 
an investor analyzes a company the harder is for him to quickly evaluate new data. 
 
An overreaction is generally explained by the psychological theory called the 
representativeness heuristic. Representativeness is a tool that our brain uses to process 
and classify data rapidly. For example, individuals systematically make mistakes in 
predicting uncertain outcomes because they see patterns in random sequences. They 
usually take a short history of data as a representative for the future uncertain events. 
They see the patterns in a financial data without realizing that these are not the real 
features of the data. In fact, the evidence has shown that the company’s earnings are 
random most of the time. Despite this fact, investors become too optimistic and 
extrapolate a company’s short past history of rapid earnings growth too far into the 
future. If the company’s earnings were going up several years in a row, investors believe 
this is a trend which is going to continue. They ignore the negative signals and fail to 
perceive the reality that the past earnings growth is unlikely to repeat itself. They 
overvalue the company, which lowers the future returns as the past growth rates fail to 
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repeat themselves. In the course of time, as soon as investors realize their mistake, the 
stock price begins to correct itself.  
 
On the other hand, there are situations when it comes to an underreaction to the certain 
financial news. For example, investors underreact to good news such as earnings 
announcements that are substantially higher than expectable. They do push up the 
prices, but not enough. Since the prices are too low, subsequent returns become higher 
on average. Similar happens with the bad news announcements. The prices fall, but 
they do not fall enough. The process of information incorporation into the prices goes 
slowly.  
 
A phenomenon used to explain an underreaction is called conservatism. It states that 
the individuals are, once they have formed a certain impression, slow to change their 
beliefs in the face of new evidence. They are skeptical and disregard the full information 
content, probably believing that the news are of temporary nature. They adjust their 
stock valuation only gradually. As they are getting better information over the time, they 
move from the initial reference point and overcome their mental mistake.  
 
4.2.2 Other Behavioral Biases 
 
Another type of the behavioral biases is a non wealth-maximizing behavior. It happens 
frequently that investors hold the looser portfolios too long, and sell the winner portfolios 
too soon. Possible explanation for such a behavior could be a concept of regret or loss 
aversion, i.e. “the fact that for most investors the pain associated with losses exceeds 
the pleasure of gains”.22 The human emotions, such as fear and greed, play a crucial 
role in their decision-making process. 
  
Applied to the market, the concept of loss aversion can also be recognized in different 
amounts of a risk premium required for growth and value stocks. Because the growth 
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 cf Russell, J. F., “Behavioral Finance and the Sources of Alpha”, Journal of Pension Plan Investing 2 
(3), 1998, p. 9. 
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companies are those that have recently performed well, investors are less concerned 
about future possible losses and are willing to accept more risk. This is why they require 
a lower risk premium for growth stocks, driving their prices even higher and lowering the 
expected returns at the same time. On the other hand, investors usually perceive value 
stocks as riskier than they actually are. This is due to the fact that the low current prices 
of the value companies indicate that they have recently suffered losses. Investors 
require a higher risk premium for these companies, lowering their stocks’ prices even 
further and increasing the expected future returns.  
 
What kind of a decision an investor is going to make, depends also on how a given 
problem is presented to him. For example, if he sees an impressive history of the long-
term stock returns relative to those on bonds, he will invest more in the stocks than he 
would do if he saw only the volatile short-term stock returns. 
 
The confidence is another factor identified by the psychologists to have a significant 
influence in people’s decision-making process. The numerous studies have shown that 
people are generally and regularly overconfident in their judgments. This is also logical, 
because otherwise they would not make any important changes in their lives. Similarly, 
investors make changes in their portfolios because they believe these changes will do 
better. The evidence has shown that only about 15 % of investors beat the market over 
a long period of time. The overconfidence is exactly the reason why the managers and 
their clients believe they will beat the index despite the fact that the majority will not. 
Christopher Browne made a psychological experiment with a group of people of 
approximately the same intelligence. They were asked to rate their own investment skills 
relative to the others in the room at the rate 1 to 10. The most logical score would be an 
average result of 5. However, the result was 7.5.23  
 
 
 
 
                                            
23
 cf Browne, C., “The Little Book of Value Investing”, 2006. 
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4.2.3 Empirical Evidence for Behavioral Explanation 
 
In their direct test of the extrapolation theory, Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (LSV, 
1994) classified the stocks into ten portfolios at the end of April each year from 1968 to 
1989. They used book-to-market (B/M), cash-flow-to-price (C/P), earnings-to-price (E/P) 
and growth in sales (GS) as a ranking criterion. The first decile portfolio was made up of 
value stocks, i.e. those with the lowest financial ratios, while the last portfolio was made 
up of glamour stocks, i.e. the stocks with the highest financial ratios. They used the 
earnings, cash flow, and past growth in sales to measure the past performance. On the 
other side, they used price-to-current earnings and cash flow to measure expected 
performance of the stocks. They made this kind of a distinction because they wanted to 
test the basic characteristics of value and glamour stocks as defined by the contrarian 
model: Value stocks are those whose past performance was poor and which are also 
expected to perform poorly in the future; Glamour stocks are expected to perform well in 
the future, as they performed well in the past. Or in other words, value stocks are out of 
the favor stocks and the market is too pessimistic about their future performance. 
Glamour stocks are those which are favored by the market, and the market is too 
optimistic about their future performance. LSV (1994) started with a classification of 
value and glamour stocks based on either past or expected growth but then moved on to 
classification based on both past and expected growth. They monitored a performance 
of each portfolio for the next five years after a portfolio formation. 
 
The results of their study showed that value stocks outperformed glamour stocks over 
the five years period. Furthermore, the results apply to the large companies as well as to 
the small companies. The portfolios sorted on C/P generated even bigger differences in 
returns between value and glamour stocks than those sorted on B/M. This confirmed the 
statement of La Porta (1993) that the value investing strategies generally produce better 
results when the market’s expectations of the future growth are used instead of the 
financial ratios. 
 
In order to examine the importance of each ratio in explaining the performance 
variations, LSV conducted a multiple regression analysis each April from 1968 to 1989. 
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As opposed to Fama and French (1992), they found that B/M and size were not 
significant once the other variables were included. Instead, they found GS and C/P to be 
the main drivers.  
 
They also provided evidence that glamour and value stocks are indeed characterized by 
the expectational errors and an excessive extrapolation. This is the essence of the 
extrapolation model, which they confirmed by comparing directly the past growth rates of 
the stocks with the actual and expected growth rates. They showed that glamour stocks 
had a higher growth in the sales, earnings, and cash flow in the past than value stocks. 
For example, in the pre-ranking period glamour stocks rose in the earnings by 139 % 
compared with 22.5 % of value stocks. Over the next five years, the earnings growth 
was almost the same for both groups. The market forecasts for glamour stocks were 
obviously too optimistic relative to value stocks, i.e. the actual future growth rates of 
glamour stocks neither matched their past growth rates, nor the market’s expectations. 
The market belief in the continuation of a long-term trend for many years has resulted in 
the superior value returns. 
 
LSV exclude the possibility of the risk being the cause for the performance differential 
between value and glamour stocks since their results apply to most of the years they 
examined. They analyzed a performance of value stocks dependent on the market state 
(there were four recessions identified during their sample period). The results showed 
that value stocks did disproportionately well in the extreme good times, and quite well in 
the extreme bad times. If value stocks outperformed glamour stocks in some states 
(according to the traditional risk-based explanation, this should be bad states of the 
world), one could say that value stocks are fundamentally riskier. In contrast, the value 
investing strategies appeared to be no riskier than the naive strategies. They confirmed 
these findings by using the traditional “beta” measures of risk too. A difference within 
standard deviations of returns namely between value and glamour stocks appeared to 
be quite small as compared to their average return differential. Furthermore, they found 
that the size-adjusted returns of both value and glamour stocks had pretty much the 
same standard deviation. They made a conclusion that the higher standard deviation of 
value stocks is due to their smaller average size. However, another analysis that they 
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made has shown that the most of the excess returns from value stocks could be earned 
by focusing on the larger stocks. Therefore, this higher return of the large value stocks 
cannot be explained by the higher standard deviation.  
 
LSV, however, do not reject the theory that the securities generating the higher returns 
“must by definition be fundamentally riskier”24. As the explanation for persistently higher 
returns of value stocks relative to glamour stocks, they state that it could be simply 
because investors did not know about these differences. Most of the investors were not 
able to conduct such an analysis until recently. Investors usually prefer investing in the 
“popular” stocks, i.e. the companies with a high current profitability. They see these 
companies as a good investment irrespective of the price.  
 
La Porta, Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) explain the superior returns of value 
stocks as a result of the market’s expectation that the past growth difference between 
value and growth stocks “will persist much longer than is reliably predictable from past 
data”.25 This is reflected in the large difference between the value and growth price-to-
earnings multiples. Besides, referring to the existing evidence (among others Little in 
1962), they emphasize that the earnings growth rates are predictable only one to two 
years into the future. They have done a direct test of the expectational errors hypothesis 
by examining the market’s reactions to earnings announcements over a five-year period 
after the portfolio formation. They wanted to confirm a pre-assumption that earnings 
surprises in this period are systematically positive for value stocks and systematically 
negative for growth stocks (since value stocks were found to have persistent superior 
returns over a five-year period). For these purposes, they ranked portfolios using two 
different classifications: The one is consistent with Fama and French (1992) and uses 
B/M as a ranking criterion, while the other one is two-dimensional and consistent with 
LSV (1994), using the cash flow-to-price ratio and past growth in sales as a ranking 
criterion. In the latter one, value stocks were identified as those that had a poor growth 
in the past, and are expected to grow slowly in the future. As a result, La Porta et al. 
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(1997) have identified the positive earnings surprises for value stocks which were 
characterized by the long post-formation persistence. Value stocks had the earnings 
announcement returns significantly higher than growth stocks. The final conclusion is 
that the expectational errors about future earnings announcement maybe cannot 
completely explain a return differential between value and growth stocks but they 
certainly do explain a significant portion of it.   
 
Coval and Shumway (2005) tested an impact of the behavioral biases on the price-
setting process. Their study differs from the existing evidence on this particular issue in 
a way that it focuses on the traders who work with a significant amount of capital daily, 
covering over 95 % of all trades at the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT). They examined 
several common behavioral alternatives such as: self-attribution bias, 
representativeness bias, the house-money effect and loss aversion. They divided the 
trading day into two periods in order to show a relationship between the realized profits 
in the morning and the subsequent risk-taking in the afternoon of professional traders. 
The results indicate that the CBOT traders are highly loss averse. Therefore, they are 
more likely to take on additional risk in the afternoon following the losses in the morning 
(31.2 % chance) than following the gains (27 % chance). In contrary, the traders who 
attribute past gains to their own ability, or who consider these gains as representative of 
the future opportunities, take more an above-average risk as their profits grow. Next, 
Coval and Shumway (2005) also examined whether the loss avers traders are more 
likely to be “price-setting”, i.e. at which level they tend to purchase at a higher price or 
sell at a lower price after the losses occurred. They found that the losing traders are 
around 15 % more likely to trade at different purchase and sales prices in the afternoon 
than the winning traders. However, an impact of the losing traders on the prices did not 
seem to have a long-term character. The price changes showed a strong magnitude of 
reversal to the previous levels.  
 
Consistent with an evidence that investors tend to either underreact or overreact to good 
or bad news, Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997) have provided a model that should 
explain how investors form their beliefs. They examined the nature of mispricing by 
using one investor and one asset in the model. They assumed that the earnings of a 
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given firm follow a random walk, while the investor believed that the earnings can be 
either mean-reverting or that they can trend (i.e. rise further after an increase). If a 
positive earnings surprise was followed by another positive surprise, the investor 
believed he was in a trending state. This investor reacted too little to the individual 
earnings announcements. This behavior is consistent with the conservatism. On the 
other hand, if a positive earnings surprise was followed by a negative surprise, the 
investor believed to be in a mean-reverting state. This investor was subject to a 
representativeness heuristic. The model of Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (BSV, 1997) 
confirmed the theory of Griffin and Tversky (1992) that people pay too much attention to 
the strength of the evidence and too little attention to its statistical weight. BSV (1997) 
mention the example of the market crash in 1987. Their interpretation of this event is 
that “investors overreacted to the news of panic selling by other investors even though 
there was little fundamental news about security values”26. So, the fact that this was a 
high-strength-and-low-weight event should explain the overreaction. 
 
In the model specifically, BSV assumed that the corporate earnings announcement was 
a low-strength-and-high-weight event, while the consistent patterns of the news were the 
high-strength-and-low-weight news events. The first assumption has led them to the 
conclusion that the stock prices underreact to the earnings announcements, while the 
latter one indicated that the stock prices overreact to consistent patterns of good or bad 
news. 
 
Behavioral finance is relatively new field. This is the reason why considerable empirical 
evidence supporting this theory still does not exist as compared to the numerous studies 
dedicated to a traditional Modern Portfolio Theory. Furthermore, the fact is that the 
traditional theories are much easier to analyze than the psychological issues related to 
behavioral finance. The problem with the behavioral finance evidence is a time horizon. 
Very short sample periods are used in the studies to examine an investor behavior – 
usually one trading day. This is not without importance if we know that the results of 
such studies are always extended to the long-term periods.  
                                            
26
 cf  Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny, “A Model of Investor Sentiment”, Journal of Financial Economics 49 
(3), 1998, p. 28. 
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However, the popularity of behavioral finance is rising. The existing evidence has proven 
that its theories, based on psychological observation, help explaining the cross-sectional 
differences in the returns. There is an important advantage of the behavioral finance 
theory over the traditional investment strategies: It is based on human behavior, and 
human behavior does not change very fast.   
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5 Empirical Analysis of the European Stock Market 
 
5.1 Motivation 
 
Many empirical studies have been executed in the field of value investing. Based on 
historical financial data, nearly all of them found that value stocks delivered superior 
returns in the long run compared to growth stocks. However, most of these studies 
concentrated on the American stock market27, and only few of them on the international 
market including Europe. The European stock market has remained relatively under-
researched. This is the reason why I decided to conduct an empirical analysis of the 
European stock market based on the Dow Jones Stoxx 600 Index. 
 
5.2 Purpose of the Analysis 
 
Purpose of this analysis is to test whether value stocks outperform both growth stocks 
and the market index over a longer period of time. Constructing portfolios with low 
financial ratios on the one side (representing the value portfolios), and high financial 
ratios on the other side (representing the growth portfolios), should generate superior 
returns of the first group compared to both the market index and the high financial 
variables group. Furthermore, an observation of performance of different portfolio 
classes over years should confirm the significance of financial ratios in identifying 
“winners”. At the same time, the ability of the low-financial-ratio or the value portfolios to 
outperform the market and the growth portfolios over the observed period should show 
that the market is inefficient. 
  
 
 
 
                                            
27
 Fama and French (1992, 1993, 1996); Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994); La Porta et al. (1997); 
Chan, Jegadeesh and Lakonishok (1995). 
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5.3 Methodology and Data Description 
 
The analysis I have carried out is based on some most important financial ratios: price-
to-earnings, price-to-book, price-to-sales ratio and dividend yield. I have used historical 
data to calculate these ratios for all individual stocks contained in the index Dow Jones 
Stoxx 600. To form the ranked portfolios, I have divided the stocks into deciles, i.e. 10 % 
groups classified depending on the level of their ratio. The first group stands for value 
stocks and contains always 10 % of the stocks with the lowest ratios. (Except for 
dividend-yield portfolios where the first group of the stocks has the highest multiples.) 
The last group represents always growth stocks containing 10 % of the stocks with the 
highest ratios. (This group has the lowest ratios within dividend-yield portfolios.) This 
kind of portfolio construction is done for each ratio separately, so in the end I have four 
groups each containing ten decile portfolios. The companies are included in a portfolio 
for a given ratio even if they do not have data on all the four ratios. The entire data are 
taken from Bloomberg. In order to get the unbiased portfolios and the returns free of the 
size factor, I used the same weighted-average size for all stocks. To make sure that all 
the necessary financial ratios are known before performance is calculated, I collected 
monthly accounting data for the calendar years t-1.28 Based on this data, rebalancing is 
done on the end of every calendar year from 1999 to 2006 using the same criterion for 
the portfolio ranking described above. 
 
The prices used in calculations are always the last traded prices in the period and they 
are adjusted for historical stock splits. The price-to-earnings ratio is calculated using 
trailing twelve months earnings per share before extraordinary items. Book value used 
for calculating the price-to-book ratio is the sum of share capital, additional paid-in 
capital and retained earnings. Sales per share incorporated in the price-to-sales formula 
are calculated by dividing trailing sales (i.e. sales from the last four quarters) with the 
average shares outstanding. For the dividend yield formula, I used trailing twelve 
months dividends per share as disclosed on the income statement. (There is a gap 
between the share prices at yearend and at the day when dividends are actually paid 
                                            
28
 I refer myself to the relative numbers since the accounting data is actually reported quarterly by the 
companies. 
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out.) Dividends per share are based on the regular cash dividends per share, and 
exclude memorial and special cash dividends.  
 
Performance measurement is done from July of the year t to end of June of the year t+1 
in order to ensure that returns really reflect the financial data collected before. I 
assumed that the entire financial data for all the firms involved is fully available and 
made public six months after the fiscal yearend. Performance is calculated using the 
Total Return Strategy which includes dividends rather than considering only price 
variations. This is usually considered a more accurate method of measurement because 
it assumes that all dividend payments are reinvested. For these purposes, I used 
monthly data on prices and dividends calculating monthly total return which is then 
annualized. The time-period used to observe the average return movement covers 
seven years from 1.07.2000 to 30.06.2007.  
 
In addition, I have conducted the univariate regression analysis of all the portfolios in 
order to test the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). The monthly risk premiums of the 
stocks (rj-rf) are regressed against the monthly risk premiums of the index (rm-rf) over the 
seven-year period. The excess returns over the market (α) are then annualized. I have 
used 1 Month EURIBOR as a risk-free rate.     
  
5.4 Dow Jones Stoxx 600 – Index Composition and Performance 
 
The Dow Jones Stoxx 600 (DJ Stoxx 600) is used as a benchmark for many European 
portfolios. It has a fixed number of 600 constituents, and is designed to represent 
business activities of the large, mid and small capitalization companies in Europe. Each 
capitalization group contains 200 constituents. Currently it covers 18 countries: Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the 
United Kingdom. The index is available daily back to December 31, 1986, and it was 
introduced on June 15, 1998. The individual stocks included in the index are ranked 
using free-float market capitalization. The index composition and free-float weights are 
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reviewed quarterly. The index is used as a basis for four regional sub-indices: DJ Euro 
Stoxx, DJ Stoxx ex UK, DJ Stoxx Nordic and DJ Stoxx ex Euro. Current index market 
capitalization is EUR 7,251.45 bn based on the free-float, and EUR 8,958.41 bn based 
on the full market capitalization. The graph below should give a first impression of how 
the index performed over the observed period of time. 
 
Figure 5.1: Index performance based on monthly data from 1.07.2000 to 30.06.2007 
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5.5 Results of the Study 
 
5.5.1 Price-To-Book Ratio 
 
The results of the annual total returns of all ten portfolios from 1.07.2000 to 30.06.2007 
show that the stocks with lower P/B ratio on average had much better performance than 
the stocks with higher P/B ratio. This period coincides with the reversal of a large bubble 
in technology in 2000. The average performance of decile portfolios together is much 
higher than the market performance for the same period of time. This could be due to 
missing data for some companies contained in the index (only 450 out of 600 companies 
had data on the P/B ratio). When comparing only the first and the last decile portfolios 
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(representing the value and the growth portfolios respectively), we can see that value 
stocks outperformed growth stocks over all the seven years. The magnitude of the value 
premium was especially strong in the first sample period, when the value portfolio 
generated return by 46.63 % higher than the growth portfolio return (see Figure 6.3). 
However, the lowest P/B portfolio (portfolio I) did not have the highest annual return 
through all the seven years. Also, the highest P/B portfolio (portfolio X) did not always 
have the lowest annual return compared to the other decile portfolios. For example, in 
the period from 1.07.2006 to 30.06.2007, the highest return had the portfolio V while the 
lowest had the portfolio VIII. If we take a look at the seven-year average, the result is 
following: With the average of 19.28 % per year, value stocks more than outperformed 
growth stocks that generated only 4.69 % average annual return. However, what was 
not expected is that the portfolio V with 19.60 % p.a. had the largest average return of all 
the portfolios. Details can be taken from the table below.  
 
Table 5.1: Average annual returns for decile portfolios sorted on the P/B ratio over 7 
years period 
 
The first decile group in the table represents value stocks, i.e. those with the lowest P/B 
ratio, while the last decile group represents growth stocks, i.e. those with the highest P/B 
ratio. Mean is a seven-year average performance. The years in the first column 
represent the periods from July of the year t to end of June of the year t+1.    
 
 I (low) II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X (high) 
2000 26.48% 19.33% 14.47% 20.30% 20.43% 13.55% 7.53% 2.89% -14.97% -20.15% 
2001 6.06% 2.14% 5.43% 5.72% 5.60% -9.35% -7.52% -19.47% -10.19% -18.77% 
2002 0.53% -0.52% -5.99% -3.51% 0.02% -1.90% -5.90% -6.95% -9.65% -1.88% 
2003 2.67% 3.20% 2.83% 2.35% 2.42% 2.57% 2.38% 2.64% 2.43% 2.45% 
2004 29.36% 24.64% 32.88% 28.30% 34.98% 29.39% 22.82% 16.53% 19.91% 15.15% 
2005 35.23% 30.29% 21.71% 28.28% 30.32% 38.17% 25.37% 26.95% 29.92% 25.66% 
2006 34.65% 33.86% 28.59% 31.84% 43.46% 37.14% 34.07% 27.45% 28.74% 30.34% 
mean 19.28% 16.13% 14.27% 16.18% 19.60% 15.65% 11.25% 7.15% 6.60% 4.69% 
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Figure 5.2: Comparison of the value and growth stocks portfolio based on the P/B ratio 
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Figure 5.3: Annual value premium based on the P/B ratio  
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Results of the Regression Analysis 
 
One of the main claims of the CAPM model is that an excess expected return of the 
assets should equal zero. From the table bellow we can see that all the portfolios 
yielded an excess return (α) higher than the CAPM predicts. At the 5 % significance 
level, the null hypothesis that α = 0 can be rejected for all the portfolios except for the 
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last one. (The first nine portfolios all have t-statistic higher than 2, while the last one has 
t-statistic of 0.67.) The average value premium, i.e. the difference between α for the first 
portfolio and α for the last portfolio, is equal 14.91 % annually. Caution should be taken 
regarding the fact that all the portfolios generated an excess return over the market. One 
reason for this could be the unavailability of the data for companies that no longer exist.  
   
The results do not provide evidence of a reliable positive correlation between ß and 
average returns. As opposed to the central prediction of the Sharpe-Lintner-Black (SLB) 
model, the stocks with higher average returns surprisingly have lower estimated ßs than 
those with lower average returns. (The value portfolio has ß of 0.85 whereas the growth 
portfolio has ß of 1.37.) This could be explained by the fact that the risk-free rate was 
higher than the index return over some periods of time. Since the CAPM model is based 
on a positive risk-return trade off, the market return must be higher than the risk-free 
rate in order to prove the positive relation between ß and the average returns. Negative 
market premium in 33 out of 84 months observed has contributed that high-beta stocks’ 
realized returns are lower than low-beta stocks’ realized returns. In order to know 
whether the ß-variable is sufficient in explaining the risk premiums of the stocks, a 
regression analysis of the periods with positive and negative market risk premiums 
should be done separately.      
 
Table 5.2: Results of the univariate regression analysis of the portfolios sorted on the 
P/B ratio 
 
 I (low) II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X (high)
α 17.28% 15.41% 13.14% 14.11% 16.83% 13.33% 9.47% 5.79% 4.72% 2.38% 
t-statistics (α) 5.32 5.24 4.24 5.65 6.31 5.61 4.69 2.28 2.22 0.67 
ß 0.85 0.90 0.94 0.90 1.01 1.03 0.97 1.02 1.03 1.37 
t-statistics (ß) 13.79 16.22 16.05 19.08 20.05 23.00 25.35 21.23 25.76 20.33 
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5.5.2 Price-To-Earnings Ratio 
 
When comparing the annual performance from 1.07.2000 to 30.06.2007 for decile 
portfolios formed using the P/E ratio, we can see that the first decile portfolio (value 
stocks) earned superior annual returns over the last decile portfolio (growth stocks). This 
applies to all periods except to the third (1.07.2002 - 30.06.2003) and the last one 
(1.07.2006 - 30.06.2007). Apart from these two periods where we have negative value 
premium, the magnitude of the value premium seems to be very strong across the rest 
of the years. In 2001 and 2003 it was even stronger than based on the P/B ratio. The 
results of the average seven-year returns are similar to those based on the P/B ratio: 
Value stocks do have superior performance compared to growth stocks (the average 
value premium is 11.77 %). However, the highest average was generated by portfolio II 
(though only slightly higher than the portfolio I), and the lowest by portfolio IX.  
 
Table 5.3: Average annual returns for decile portfolios sorted on the P/E ratio over 7 
years period 
 
 I (low) II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X (high)
2000 22.99% 30.35% 21.08% 12.20% 17.13% 10.18% 12.44% 0.08% -15.04% -20.51%
2001 11.10% 17.07% 0.88% -0.02% -3.21% -7.56% -10.28% -11.99% -23.96% -19.14%
2002 3.11% -3.25% -0.77% -8.02% -10.82% -6.30% -8.18% -4.05% -3.02% 6.78% 
2003 40.37% 30.80% 31.16% 38.07% 37.21% 45.28% 29.91% 29.59% 45.77% 32.24%
2004 28.73% 29.16% 25.58% 34.15% 28.77% 26.74% 20.19% 19.70% 16.67% 16.59%
2005 31.66% 28.75% 31.82% 26.18% 21.73% 25.02% 34.31% 27.47% 26.70% 27.01%
2006 30.28% 35.69% 31.44% 38.98% 28.06% 34.48% 33.12% 32.25% 27.26% 42.91%
mean 24.03% 24.08% 20.17% 20.22% 16.98% 18.26% 15.93% 13.29% 10.62% 12.27%
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Figure 5.4: Comparison of the value and growth stocks portfolio based on the P/E ratio  
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Figure 5.5: Annual value premium based on the P/E ratio 
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Results of the Regression Analysis 
 
The results of the univariate regression analysis of the portfolios sorted on the P/E ratio 
are consistent with those based on the P/B ratio. In the table below we can observe 
positive excess returns of all the portfolios. Only for the last two of them the t-statistics 
lower than 2 allow that the CAPM model can be accepted. For the rest of the portfolios, 
the CAPM can be rejected at the significance level of 5 %. The average annual value 
premium is slightly lower than for the portfolios sorted on the P/B ratio (12.48 %). 
 
The ß-variable unfortunately cannot be used to check the validity of the CAPM since the 
results are similar to those of the P/B portfolios. The same argumentation that I stated 
above for the P/B portfolios can be applied in this case too. 
 
Table 5.4: Results of the univariate regression analysis of the portfolios sorted on the 
P/E ratio 
 
 I (low) II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X (high)
α 17.32% 17.33% 14.00% 13.41% 10.87% 11.61% 9.51% 7.18% 3.42% 4.76% 
t-statistics (α) 6.42 5.95 5.11 5.65 4.18 4.91 4.52 2.90 1.15 1.30 
ß 0.82 0.78 0.77 0.93 0.79 0.92 1.07 1.12 1.33 1.57 
t-statistics (ß) 16.10 14.22 14.84 20.72 16.06 20.57 26.81 23.86 23.81 22.70 
 
5.5.3 Price-To-Sales Ratio 
 
If we observe the portfolio returns through the years, we can see that value stocks 
outperformed growth stocks each year except from 1.07.2002 to 30.06.2003 when they 
generated losses of 8.83 %. If we compare the seven-year annual returns, we can see 
that the first decile portfolio had the highest one (24.32 %), while the last decile portfolio 
had the lowest one (11.32 %).   
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Table 5.5: Average annual returns for decile portfolios sorted on the P/S ratio over 7 
years period 
 
 I (low) II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X (high)
2000 25.47% 14.50% 18.53% 12.47% 14.04% 6.01% 5.99% 0.42% -7.13% -11.67%
2001 5.69% 4.86% -0.97% -2.30% -4.93% 2.24% -7.29% -10.68% -11.72% -25.17%
2002 -8.83% -4.93% -3.65% -6.00% -5.45% 1.07% 4.05% -1.28% -2.79% 6.11% 
2003 56.32% 36.54% 40.19% 40.30% 39.43% 38.55% 29.94% 30.24% 27.69% 35.18%
2004 26.52% 36.21% 20.77% 25.05% 24.33% 25.81% 25.54% 26.69% 26.00% 25.32%
2005 27.28% 38.28% 26.99% 23.13% 26.49% 26.71% 28.25% 27.58% 27.70% 22.09%
2006 37.81% 31.82% 33.27% 36.41% 26.97% 39.11% 25.79% 32.26% 29.30% 27.40%
mean 24.32% 22.47% 19.31% 18.44% 17.27% 19.93% 16.04% 15.03% 12.72% 11.32%
 
 
Figure 5.6: Comparison of the value and growth stocks portfolio based on the P/S ratio  
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Figure 5.7: Annual value premium based on the P/S ratio 
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Results of the Regression Analysis 
 
The null hypothesis that α = 0 can be rejected for all the portfolios except for the last 
one. The average value premium is 11.76 % annually. As opposed to the portfolios 
sorted on the P/B and P/E ratios, we can see that in this case there is not much 
difference in the ß-value across decile portfolios. Moreover, ß of the value portfolio is 
almost the same as for the growth portfolio (difference is only 0.02). At the same time, 
the difference in their excess returns is relatively high. The same could be said for the 
portfolios V and IX: They even have exactly the same ß of 1. So, no reliable relationship 
between ß and average returns over the observed period can be found.  
 
Table 5.6: Results of the univariate regression analysis of the portfolios sorted on the 
P/S ratio 
 
 I (low) II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X (high)
α 16.44% 15.47% 12.91% 11.97% 10.99% 13.45% 10.32% 8.90% 6.70% 4.62% 
t-statistics (α) 4.45 5.43 4.41 4.80 4.75 5.67 5.34 4.17 2.69 1.42 
ß 1.15 0.94 0.92 0.96 1.00 0.93 0.82 0.99 1.00 1.17 
t-statistics (ß) 16.44 17.43 16.62 20.31 22.88 20.71 22.55 24.50 21.34 19.11 
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5.5.4 Dividend Yield 
 
Consistent with the results of most of the studies that analyze the relationship between 
dividend yield (DY) and average stock returns, I have found this relationship to be 
relatively weak over the observed period. There is a small difference in the seven-year 
performance of the value and growth portfolios (22.72 % and 20.02 % respectively). 
Moreover, the value portfolio (represented by the stocks with the highest DY) 
outperformed the growth portfolio (represented by the stocks with the lowest DY) in only 
three periods out of seven. The value premium was very high in the first two periods (in 
the first period the second-highest, and in the second period the highest of all portfolios 
sorted on other ratios). On the other hand, there was an extremely negative value 
premium from 1.07.2003 to 30.06.2004 and from 1.07.2005 to 30.06.2006. Although the 
value portfolio generated positive performance over all the seven years, there were 
periods when the growth portfolio significantly outperformed the value portfolio. 
Furthermore, the portfolio with the highest average return over seven years is the 
portfolio III with 22.94 % annually. More details are given in the table below. 
 
Table 5.7: Average annual returns for decile portfolios sorted on DY over 7 years period 
 
 I (high) II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X (low) 
2000 28.65% 27.04% 26.03% 16.91% 15.66% 11.69% -11.73% 31.39% -11.29% -15.61%
2001 14.78% 7.67% 4.13% 2.38% -5.13% -6.82% -15.45% -16.40% -14.17% -27.10%
2002 1.36% -2.00% -1.42% -7.19% -8.83% -1.28% -5.63% -14.40% -2.81% 1.82% 
2003 31.38% 34.10% 35.70% 38.83% 34.09% 26.44% 30.66% 31.33% 35.76% 73.27%
2004 26.33% 23.82% 29.74% 32.11% 26.37% 26.08% 21.95% 20.07% 20.15% 17.93%
2005 27.00% 29.30% 32.87% 24.94% 24.50% 21.41% 26.20% 24.51% 36.68% 54.26%
2006 29.57% 31.39% 33.54% 39.37% 38.29% 33.54% 38.23% 36.74% 32.82% 35.58%
mean 22.72% 21.62% 22.94% 21.05% 17.85% 15.86% 12.03% 16.18% 13.88% 20.02%
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Figure 5.8: Comparison of the value and growth stocks portfolio based on DY 
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Figure 5.9: Annual value premium based on DY 
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Results of the Regression Analysis 
 
The univariate regression analysis provided once more a positive average excess return 
for all the decile portfolios. In this case, the CAPM model cannot be accepted for none of 
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the ten portfolios when checking the null hypothesis α = 0. The annual value premium is 
6.74 %. The relation between ß-values and average returns is similar to the one seen for 
the P/B and P/E portfolios. The results are reversed to the general prediction that the 
portfolios with higher average returns should also have higher ß. 
 
Table 5.8: Results of the univariate regression analysis of the portfolios sorted on DY  
 
 I (high) II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X (low)
α 16.42% 15.27% 16.14% 14.20% 11.42% 10.06% 9.50% 5.45% 6.95% 9.68% 
t-statistics (α) 5.25 5.24 5.82 5.32 4.65 4.49 3.27 2.62 2.65 2.28 
ß 0.75 0.79 0.89 0.95 0.92 0.89 1.01 1.15 1.27 1.60 
t-statistics (ß) 12.75 14.30 16.96 18.78 19.81 20.96 18.36 29.33 25.55 19.87 
 
5.6 Summary  
 
The results of my empirical analysis confirm the prediction of the value investing theory 
that value stocks outperform both the market and growth stocks over a longer period of 
time. The most significant difference between value and growth stocks is observable in 
the period from 1.07.2000 to 30.06.2003. During this period, value stocks generally had 
positive performance, while growth stocks had extremely negative performance. I 
assume that this is due to the market crisis caused by the technology bubble, the 
negative consequences of which were present at least until 2002. As opposed to growth 
stocks, value stocks performed well in bad as well as in good times. 
  
I can confirm a great significance of the P/B, P/E and P/S ratios for identifying value 
stocks, since they have yielded a very high premium over growth stocks. Unfortunately, 
this cannot be said for the DY ratio whose value portfolio generated the average return 
only by 2.70 % higher than the growth portfolio. This is due to the extremely good 
performance of growth stocks (sorted on DY) in the sample periods 2003, 2005 and 
2006 during the economic recovery.  
   
From the table below we can see that the highest average value premium over the 
whole sample period was achieved by the value portfolio sorted on the P/B ratio. 
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Furthermore, all the value portfolios generated an extremely high average excess return 
over the market. The highest one had the value portfolio sorted on the P/S ratio.  
 
Table 5.9: The average value premium and the average excess return for the P/B, P/E, 
P/S and DY value portfolios over 7 years period 
 
 P/B P/E P/S DY 
Mean VP 14.60% 11.77% 13.00% 2.70% 
Sample Mean α 15.03% 19.78% 20.07% 18.47% 
 
The graph below provides an insight into how the four value portfolios performed 
compared to the market over the seven years period. We can see that all of them 
significantly outperformed the market during the whole period observed. An exception is 
the P/B value portfolio which underperformed the market in the fourth period.  
 
Figure 5.10: Performance of the market index and value portfolios based on the P/B, 
P/E, P/S and DY ratios  
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The regression analysis did not provide results which could support the CAPM model or 
confirm the efficiency of the market. First, reliable relation between ß and the average 
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excess returns could not be found (in addition, t-statistics were extremely high). I 
assume that the negative market premium has contributed to the results which are 
opposed to the central prediction of the SLB model: The portfolios with higher excess 
return generally had lower ß than the portfolios with lower excess return. However, ß-
variables for the portfolios sorted on the P/S ratio did not follow this pattern. They 
provided very similar values for all the portfolios. The question remains opened whether 
the excess returns could be explained by adding some additional explanatory variables 
to the analysis (e.g. those used by Fama and French in the Three Factor Model). 
Second, the analysis of the average excess return could not confirm the validity of the 
CAPM model either. For almost all the portfolios the CAPM was rejected using the 
significance level of 5 %. Surprisingly, every single portfolio achieved the average return 
higher than the average market return. Third, the average R² values varied from      
80.72 % for the DY portfolios to 82.67 % for the P/S portfolios. This indicates that    
17.33 % or more than 17.33 % of the variation observed in realized returns could not be 
explained by the CAPM model. 
 
5.7 Shortcomings of the Study 
 
The quality and accuracy of my analysis depend highly on the quality and reliability of 
data collected. Furthermore, it is highly debatable whether historical data can be a good 
indicator of the future results. 
  
Regarding the results that are obtained by comparing the value and the growth stocks 
over time, the critical point is the time period observed. The seven years period could be 
too short period of time to make some serious conclusions. It is also questionable 
whether the portfolios formed on different financial ratios should be compared between 
each other since the sample of the firms used is not the same for all the four ratios. The 
companies that no longer exist are not included in the study, which means that a 
survivorship bias is present. 
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6 Conclusion 
 
The common characteristic for all the value practitioners is their contrarian behavior. 
They are going against the crowd and market trends: Looking for the stocks that trade at 
a discount, they buy when everyone sells and sell when everyone buys. The essence of 
their strategy is margin of safety or the difference between the true and the market value 
of a stock. It should be large enough to protect investors against uncertainty. A success 
of the value investors challenges the Efficient Market Hypothesis and its proposition that 
the excess returns are result of a lucky circumstance. There is a lot of debate among 
investors about the exact sources of the superior value returns. Some investors are in 
favor of the traditional theory which says that the superior value returns are simply 
compensation for the higher risk associated with value stocks. Other investors are in 
favor of behavioral finance theory whose popularity is rising in the recent time. It says 
that the source of the value premium is investors’ systematical judgment errors caused 
by different behavioral biases. There is a considerable amount of evidence supporting 
both of these explanations but it still cannot be said whether any of them is completely 
correct or completely incorrect. Some future surveys will hopefully provide further proofs 
on reliability or unreliability of these theories in explaining the value premium.  
 
While the basic principles of value investing, laid down by Benjamin Graham decades 
ago, remained the same, the methods for identifying value stocks and the criteria used 
to define the value have changed over time. In the past, the value investors were more 
passive and used mainly the quantitative variables to identify value stocks. Some of 
these strategies are still used today since numerous empirical studies have proved their 
importance in determining the true value of a stock. For example, many analyses of the 
US stock market, but also of the stock markets outside the US, have found a significant 
power of some financial ratios (such as P/B, P/E, P/S and so on) in explaining the 
abnormal stock returns. Today however, most of the value investors apply the qualitative 
factors as well when it comes to identifying good businesses. 
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After analyzing the market index Dow Jones Stoxx 600, I can confirm that value stocks 
outperformed both the market and growth stocks over the seven-year period. No reliable 
relationship could be found between the excess returns and ßs, so the CAPM model 
and the market efficiency theory cannot be supported when analyzed by the univariate 
regression analysis. The value investing strategy once more has proven that it works in 
both good and bad times. Thanks to this analysis, a success of the value investing 
strategy in beating the growth investing strategy and the market can be confirmed for 
the European market particularly.  
 
Nowadays, it is much easier to access all the necessary information as technology has 
developed. Furthermore, the way of trading has changed as well. The most of the 
transactions are now done electronically. Under today’s conditions, even for Warren 
Buffett it would be hard to replicate his success from 1960s and 1970s when data 
needed was unavailable to most of the investors. The changes in the economy make it 
hard for the value investors. The economy is no more driven by big manufacturing 
industries but by the technology and service industries. The screening for value stocks 
based on the fundamental variables alone is no more enough. The truth is, if the value 
investors stick only to the tangible-asset businesses, they could miss many opportunities 
since these businesses will in the future continue to represent smaller part of the 
economy. For the dynamic world new dynamic methods have to be found in order to be 
able to capture the changes in the economic conditions and new business models. This 
has led some value investors to rather focus on the earnings estimates – as proposed 
by the economist John Burr Williams.     
 
The majority of investors still make a wrong choice as they are driven by the crowd, by 
the emotional responses dictated by greed and fear, and by the short-term orientation. 
They are looking for a formula of the successful investment strategy that would make it 
possible to speculate and jump in or out the market in order to make the high near-term 
returns while ignoring the risk. What we can conclude from this thesis is that an 
investment success cannot be captured in some mathematical equation. By contrast, 
the value investors suggest making a sound investment by focusing on the preservation 
of capital instead on a return. Without an unusual strict discipline and a high level of 
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commitment, it is certainly impossible to make this work. Most of the investors are 
unfortunately unwilling to accept this challenge. 
 
In my opinion, value investing is still the best way to beat the market and increase the 
wealth over time. As Warren Buffett points out, we do not have to be particularly smart 
to understand the philosophy behind this strategy. He once said: “The most important 
quality for an investor is temperament, not intellect... You need a temperament that 
neither derives great pleasure from being with the crowd or against the crowd.”29 
 
The value investing strategy is simple to understand but relatively difficult to implement. 
Its hardest part is actually patience. There is no way to know exactly when and, if at all, 
a particular stock will appreciate. Value investing should be viewed as buying the 
business, rather than the stocks, for the long term. A key to the successful long-term 
investing is the patience, an ability to maintain a steady state of mind in bad as well as in 
good times, and a “stomach” for the short-term losses.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
29 cf http://www.afterquotes.com/great/quotes/investing.htm 
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A) Abstract 
 
Value investing deals with selecting the stocks that trade at a discount compared to their 
true or intrinsic value, assuming that over time the market will correct for its mispricing 
and the stocks will reach its real value. Difference between the true and the market 
value of a stock is called “margin of safety” and it is exactly what protects investors from 
the uncertainty related to the value investing strategy. Value investors do not act along 
with the market, i.e. they avoid popular stocks as opposed to their major rivals – growth 
investors. The success of many value investors has challenged the Efficient Market 
Hypothesis (EMH). EMH states that the stock prices are not predictable since they 
already incorporate all the available information on the market. The truth is that the 
technology development nowadays is such that it is difficult to make advantage of 
market inefficiencies since the stock prices can rapidly be adjusted to new information.      
 
There are different strategies used by value investors to identify value companies and 
calculate the true value of a stock. Some investors are more passive and use mainly 
quantitative factors such as low price-to-book ratio, high dividend yield and so on. 
Others are more active and try to make a company more valuable by influencing the 
way it runs the business. Numerous empirical studies have proved the ability of some 
financial ratios (also called “value screens”) to identify value stocks. The most widely 
used are: price-to-book, price-to-earnings, price-to-sales ratio and dividend yield. Most 
of these studies concentrated on the US market, showing that the stocks sorted on the 
low price-to-book, price-to-earnings etc. provide superior returns to the stocks sorted on 
high financial ratios over the longer time period. Some researchers have also extended 
their analysis to the markets outside the US, proving that the cross-sectional 
predictability of the stock returns is not market-specific.  
 
There is a lot of debate about the sources of the value premium. On the one hand, there 
is traditional explanation of the Efficient Market Hypothesis which says that the value 
premium is a result of an additional risk taken by an investor. Famous academics, Fama 
and French, identified two more risk factors which together with the market risk explain 
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the variability in the stock returns. These are the factors associated with a company size 
and its value, introduced in their “Three Factor Model”. Some investors, on the other 
hand, believe in the behavioral finance explanation of the value premium. Behavioral 
finance states that the markets are inefficient as a result of investors’ systematical 
judgment errors. There are many behavioral biases influencing investors’ decision-
making. The most important one is overreaction, i.e. extrapolation of the past stock 
earnings too far into the future. This results in the underpricing of value stocks and 
overpricing of growth stocks. 
 
Empirical analysis that I carried out based on the Dow Jones Stoxx 600 Index has 
shown that value investing works in Europe too. Value stocks, identified by using price-
to-book, price-to-earnings, price-to-sales ratio and dividend yield, outperformed both the 
market and growth stocks over the observed period of seven years. The regression 
analysis did not show any reliable relationship between excess returns and ßs, so the 
CAPM model could not be supported. 
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B) German Abstract 
 
Value Investing beschäftigt sich mit der Auswahl von Aktien die im Vergleich zu ihrem 
wahren oder intrinsischen Wert mit einem Abschlag notieren, unter der Annahme, dass 
der Markt die Fehlbewertung im Laufe der Zeit korrigieren wird und dass die Aktien ihren 
richtigen Wert erreichen werden. Die Differenz zwischen dem wahren Wert und dem 
Marktwert der Aktie wird „Margin Of Safety“ genannt und ist genau das, was die 
Investoren vor der Unsicherheit der Value-Investing-Strategie schützt. Value-Investoren 
handeln nicht so wie der restliche Markt, d.h. sie meiden populäre Aktien im Gegensatz 
zu ihren größten Rivalen, den Growth-Investoren. Der Erfolg von vielen Value-
Investoren hat die Effizienzmarkthypothese in Frage gestellt. Diese besagt, dass die 
Aktienkurse nicht prognostizierbar sind da alle auf dem Markt zugängliche Informationen 
bereits in den Aktienkursen enthalten sind. Die Wahrheit ist, mit der 
Technologieentwicklung heutzutage ist es schwierig die Marktineffizienzen zu nutzen, 
da die Aktienkurse aufgrund von neuen Informationen schnell angepasst werden 
können. 
 
Value-Investoren benützen verschiedene Strategien um Value-Unternehmen zu 
identifizieren und den wahren Aktienwert zu berechnen. Einige dieser Investoren sind 
mehr passiv und benützen meistens quantitative Faktoren wie niedriges Kurs-Buchwert-
Verhältnis, hohe Dividendenrendite usw. Andere sind wiederum mehr aktiv und 
versuchen unter Beeinflussung der Geschäftsführung das Unternehmen wertvoller zu 
machen. Viele empirische Studien haben die Fähigkeit von finanzwirtschaftlichen 
Kennzahlen (so genannte „Value Screens“), die Value-Aktien zu identifizieren, 
bewiesen. Die dabei am meisten verwendeten sind: Kurs-Buchwert-, Kurs-Gewinn-, 
Kurs-Umsatz-Verhältnis und Dividendenrendite. Die meisten von diesen Studien wurden 
für den US-Markt gemacht und haben gezeigt, dass die Aktien die anhand von 
niedrigem Kurs-Buchwert-, Kurs-Gewinn-Verhältnis usw. ausgewählt wurden, langfristig 
höhere Renditen erwirtschaften als Aktien mit hohen Kennzahlen. Einige Forscher 
haben ihre Analyse auch auf die Märkte außerhalb US erweitert und haben damit 
bewiesen, dass die „cross-sectional“ Prognose von Aktienrenditen nicht marktspezifisch 
ist. 
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Es wird derzeit viel über den Uhrsprung des Value Premium diskutiert. Zum einen gibt 
es die traditionelle Erklärung der Effizienzmarkthypothese die besagt, dass das Value 
Premium Ergebnis des Zusatzrisikos ist das ein Investor eingeht. Die beiden bekannte 
Wissenschaftler, Fama und French, haben zwei Risikofaktoren identifiziert die 
zusammen mit dem Marktrisiko Schwankungen von Aktienrenditen erklären. Diese 
Faktoren sind die Unternehmensgröße und der Unternehmenswert. Sie wurden unter 
dem Begriff „Three Factor Model“ publiziert. Zum anderen gibt es Investoren die an die 
„Behavioral Finance“ Erklärung des Value Premium glauben. Behavioral Finance 
besagt, dass die Marktineffizienz das Ergebnis der systematischen Fehler in der 
Beurteilung von Seite der Investoren ist. Es gibt viele Vorurteilen die letztendlich die 
Investmententscheidung der Investoren beeinflussen. Eines der wichtigsten ist 
Überreaktion, bzw. die zu starke Extrapolation von historischen Aktienrenditen in die 
Zukunft. Dies führt in weiterer Folge zu Unterbewertung von Value-Aktien und 
Überbewertung von Growth-Aktien.  
 
Die empirische Analyse die ich basierend auf den Dow Jones Stoxx 600 Index 
durchgeführt habe, hat gezeigt dass Value Investing auch in Europa funktioniert. Value-
Aktien, die anhand von Kurs-Buchwert-, Kurs-Gewinn-, Kurs-Umsatz-Verhältnis und 
Dividendenrendite ausgewählt wurden, haben sowohl den Markt als auch die Growth-
Aktien über den betrachteten Zeitraum von sieben Jahren outperformt. Die 
darauffolgende Regressionsanalyse hat keine zuverlässige Beziehung zwischen 
Überrenditen und ßs gezeigt, sodass das „Capital Asset Pricing Model“ nicht bestätigt 
werden konnte. 
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